

POLICY REPORT

Why Ohio Should Not Build High-Speed Rail



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JUNE 2009



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

IN FEBRUARY 2009, CONGRESS DEDICATED \$8 billion of stimulus funds to high-speed rail projects. In April 2009, President Obama released his high-speed rail “vision” for America, which includes 8,500 miles that the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) had identified as potential high-speed rail routes in 2001. In June, the FRA announced its criteria for states to apply for high-speed rail grants out of the \$8 billion in stimulus funds.

Yet the FRA has no estimates how much high-speed rail will ultimately cost, who will ride it, who will pay for it, and whether the benefits can justify the costs. A realistic review shows that high-speed rail will be extremely costly and will add little to American mobility or environmental quality.

The best available data indicate that the FRA plan will cost about \$90 billion, or roughly one-fifth the inflation-adjusted cost of the Interstate Highway System. This plan will provide trains with average speeds of 140-150 miles per hour (mph) in California, 75-85 mph in Florida, and moderate-speed trains averaging 55-75 mph in Ohio and 30 other states.

The average American will ride these trains less than 60 miles per year, or about 1/70th as much as the average American travels on interstate freeways. In fact, most of the taxpayers who pay for high-speed trains will rarely or never use them. Because of a premium fare structure and downtown orientation, the main patrons of high-speed trains will be the wealthy and downtown workers, such as bankers, lawyers, and government officials, whose employers pay the fare.

A true high-speed rail system, with average speeds of 140-150 mph connecting major cities in 33 states, would cost well over \$500 billion. Meeting political demands to close gaps in the system could bring the cost close to \$1 trillion. At twice the cost of the Interstate Highway System, such a true high-speed rail system would provide less than 1/10th the mobility offered by the interstates.

These costs include only the projected capital costs. States that decide to build moderate- or high-speed rail may be responsible for cost overruns, operating losses, and the costs of replacing and rehabilitating equipment about every 19 years.

Upgrading the 450 miles of Ohio tracks in the FRA plan to run trains at 110 mph would cost taxpayers close to \$1.6 billion, or nearly \$140 for every Ohio resident. Subsidizing passenger trains over those routes will cost more than \$30 million per year. Yet the average Ohioan will take a round trip on such trains only once every 17 years.

Far from being an environmental savior, high- and moderate-speed trains are likely to do more harm to the environment than good. In intercity travel, automobiles are already as energy-efficient as Amtrak, and the energy efficiencies of both autos and airliners are growing faster than trains. The energy cost of constructing new high-speed rail lines will dwarf any operational savings. As the state of Florida concluded in 2005, “the environmentally preferred alternative is the No Build Alternative.”

To add insult to injury, the administration is likely to require states that accept high-speed rail funds to regulate property rights in a futile effort to discourage driving and promote rail travel. These regulations will deny rural landowners the right to develop their land while they make urban housing unaffordable and disrupt neighborhoods through the construction of high-density housing.

For all of these reasons—high costs, tiny benefits, and interference with property rights—Ohio should not attempt to provide high-speed rail service. Instead, it should use its share of the \$8 billion stimulus funds solely for incremental upgrades, such as safer grade crossings and signaling systems, that do not obligate state taxpayers to pay future operations and maintenance costs.

INTRODUCTION

In February 2009, President Obama asked Congress to include \$8 billion for high-speed trains in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. High-speed rail, he said, would be his “signature issue” in the stimulus program.¹ Later that month, Obama’s 2010 budget proposed to spend an additional \$1 billion per year for five years on high-speed rail.²

In April, Obama presented his national high-speed rail vision to the public. Under the plan, about 8,500 route-miles of high-speed trains would connect key cities in 33 states along the eastern and Gulf Coast seaboard, in the Midwest, Texas-Oklahoma-Arkansas, California, and the Pacific Northwest.³ In June, the Federal Railroad Administration published its guidelines for state applications for a share of the stimulus funds for local rail projects.⁴

Just as Eisenhower borrowed his 40,000-mile interstate highway plan from an existing proposal developed years before by the Bureau of Public Roads, Obama’s 8,500-mile high-speed rail network was identical to one proposed by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) in 2001.⁵ The White House claims the high-speed rail plan “mirrors that of President Eisenhower, the father of the Interstate Highway System, which revolutionized the way Americans traveled.”⁶

But there are four crucial differences between interstate highways and high-speed rail. First, the Bureau of Public

Roads gave President Eisenhower a reasonable estimate of how much the interstates would cost. But the FRA has not offered anyone an estimate of how much its high-speed rail network will cost.

Second, the Bureau of Public Roads had a plan for paying for interstate highways: through gas taxes and other highway user fees. In fact, the entire system was built on a pay-as-you-go basis out of such user fees; not a single dollar of general taxpayer money was spent on the roads. In contrast, the FRA has no financial plan for high-speed rail; no source of funds; and no expectation that passenger fares will cover all of the operating costs much less any of the capital costs.

The third key difference is that the interstates truly did revolutionize American travel, while high-speed rail will never be more than a tiny, but expensive, part of the American transportation network. In 2007, the average American traveled 4,000 miles—more than 20 percent of all passenger travel—and shipped 2,000 ton-miles of freight over the interstates.⁷

Finally, since interstate highways serve all major cities in all 50 states, it is likely that the majority of Americans travel over an interstate at least once if not several times a week. In contrast, high-speed trains will mainly be used by a relatively wealthy elite.

By comparison, the most optimistic analysis projects that, if the FRA high-speed rail network is completely built by 2025, the average American will ride this system just 58 miles per year—about 1/70th as much as the Interstate Highway System.⁸ That is hardly revolutionary. Moreover, considering the premium fares to ride high-speed trains and the fact that trains will mainly serve downtown areas, most of that use would be by the wealthy and by bankers, lawyers, government workers, and other downtown employees whose employers pay the fare, while all other taxpayers would share the cost.

The FRA is not proposing to build 200-mph bullet trains throughout the U.S. Instead, in most places it is proposing to upgrade existing freight lines to allow passenger trains to run as fast as 110 mph—which means average speeds of only 55-75 mph. This would actually be slower than driving for anyone whose origin and destination are not both right next to a train station.

VISION *for* HIGH-SPEED RAIL *in* AMERICA

The Federal Railroad Administration’s “vision” for high-speed rail includes nearly 800 miles of very-high-speed (top speed of 220 mph, average speed of 140–145 mph) lines in California, about 350 miles of high-speed (top speed of 125 mph, average speed of 80–85 mph) lines in Florida, and about 7,500 miles of moderate-speed (top speed of 110 mph, average speed of 55–75 mph) lines in other parts of the country. It is only a vision, not a real plan, because the FRA has no idea how much it will cost, how to pay for it, who will ride it, or whether the benefits justify the costs. Source: FRA, 2009, tinyurl.com/cvww8s6.

Yet even true high-speed trains have not been particularly successful in France or Japan. While the trains may be enjoyed by tourists who do not want to rent a car, the average residents of France and Japan ride them less than 400 miles per year—barely 2 percent as much as the average American travels each year. The expenditure of tens and even hundreds of billions of dollars on high-speed rail has not relieved traffic congestion on any highways or prevented the continuing decline of rail's importance as a mode of passenger transportation.

Moreover, the environmental benefits of high-speed rail are greatly exaggerated. Amtrak today is a little more energy efficient than flying and about the same as intercity driving. But airline and auto energy efficiencies have both been growing much faster than Amtrak's, so by the time any high-speed rail lines are open for business, any energy savings they provide will be negligible. Since the FRA's moderate-speed trains will be powered by Diesels and greenhouse emissions from petroleum-powered vehicles are almost exactly proportional to energy consumptions, the greenhouse-gas savings will also be negligible.

To make matters worse, high-speed rail is likely to be accompanied by land-use regulation whose benefits are dubious and costs are high. High-speed rail, various urban transit programs, and transit-oriented housing programs are all a part of the administration's so-called "livability" campaign. As Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood recently admitted, the purpose of this campaign is to "coerce people out of their cars."⁹

Given the premium fares charged for high-speed rail, the main users will be either wealthy or white-collar workers whose employers will pay the fare. This means the FRA's plan is certain to become a subsidy from ordinary taxpayers to people who are well off and already have plenty of mobility.

HIGH-SPEED RAIL'S EXPENSIVE SLIPPERY SLOPE

President Obama's high-speed rail vision was greeted with euphoria by rail advocates and members of Congress eager to stimulate the economy and distribute pork to their states and districts. As a result, few have asked critical questions about the plan, such as: How much will it cost to build? How much will it cost to operate? Who will ride it? What share of operating and capital costs will be recovered by passenger fares?

The Federal Railroad Administration's "vision" for high-speed rail makes no attempt to answer any of these questions. Instead, it merely designates corridors (table 1) and leaves to the states the job of doing cost and financial forecasts.¹⁰

Table 1: FRA High-Speed Rail Corridors

Corridor	End-Point Cities	Miles	Top Speed
California	Sacramento-San Diego	785	220
Empire	New York-Buffalo	440	125
Florida	Tampa-Orlando-Miami	355	125
Gulf Coast	Houston-Atlanta	940	110
	New Orleans-Mobile		
Keystone	Philadelphia-Pittsburgh	350	110
Midwest	Minneapolis-Chicago-St. Louis, Detroit-Chicago-Cleveland-Cincinnati-Chicago	1,805	110
	St. Louis-Kansas City	285	90
	Indianapolis-Louisville	110	79
New England	Portland-Boston-Montreal	705	110
Pacific Northwest	Eugene-Vancouver	465	110
South Central	San Antonio-Little Rock-Tulsa	915	
Southeast	Washington-Atlanta, Atlanta-Jacksonville, Raleigh-Jacksonville	1,490	110
	Richmond-Hampton Roads		

Mileages are approximate. Since 95 miles of the New England corridor and 55 miles of the Pacific Northwest corridor are in Canada, they are not counted in the 8,500-mile total mentioned in this report. Source: "High-Speed Rail Corridor Designations," Federal Railroad Administration, 2005, tinyurl.com/6s94zd. In some cases miles are estimated using Google maps.

The actual costs will depend heavily on what kind of high-speed rail is built. As table 1 shows, most of the routes are proposed to have top speeds of 110 mph. This means improving existing freight lines to allow moderately fast passenger trains.

This is hardly a new technology. In an effort to attract people out of their cars, the Burlington, Milwaukee Road, Pennsylvania, Santa Fe, Union Pacific, and other railroads all began running passenger trains at more than 100 mph in the 1930s. The Milwaukee Hiawatha, for example, routinely reached 110 mph on its route from Chicago to Minneapolis.¹¹ These fast trains were thrilling to watch but failed to stop the decline of passenger trains after World War II.

Amtrak today runs trains at top speeds of 100 mph or more in several corridors. Trains reach 150 mph between New York and Boston, 135 mph between New York and Washington, 110 mph between New York and Albany, Philadelphia and Harrisburg, and Chicago and Detroit, and 90 mph between Los Angeles and San Diego. On other routes, Amtrak trains are limited to at most 79 mph.¹² Of course, top speeds are far greater than average speeds; the average speed in the Boston-

to-Washington corridor is less than 85 mph; averages in the 110-mph corridors range from 55-65 mph.

President Obama hopes that upgrading freight lines to run faster passenger trains will also allow the railroads to increase their freight speeds and capacities, thus capturing traffic from truckers. Historically, the freight railroads have received very little federal aid: only 18,700 of 260,000 miles of rail lines built in the United States received federal subsidies.¹³ At least some Congressional Democrats see federal aid to railroads as a means of re-regulating the industry, which was deregulated in 1979. For example, if a railroad wants to close an unprofitable branch line, the federal government can use past aid to the railroad to justify a mandate that the line be kept open.¹⁴

High-speed train aficionados do not consider 110-mph trains to be true high-speed rail. The California legislature defined *high-speed rail* as lines with a top speed of greater than 125 mph. “The reason for the 125 miles per hour threshold,” says the California Senate Transportation Committee, “is that existing passenger rail equipment can operate at this speed if the appropriate signaling technology is installed and the right-of-way meets a variety of design and safety standards.”¹⁵

For safety reasons, passenger trains running faster than 110 mph are incompatible with slower freight trains. True high-speed rail cars tend to be very lightweight, and would be easily crushed in a collision with loaded freight cars.¹⁶ Such trains could not safely operate on the same tracks as freight trains.

This means any corridors calling for higher speeds require tracks dedicated to passenger trains, which usually means new construction. True high-speed rail is therefore far more expensive than 110-mph moderate-speed rail.

Various states have developed cost estimates for individual corridors. In 2004, the Midwest High Speed Rail Initiative estimated that bringing 3,150 miles of Midwest routes up to moderate-speed standards would cost \$7.7 billion, or \$2.4 million per mile.¹⁷ (All of these costs include locomotives, rail cars, and stations as well as new tracks or upgrades to existing tracks.)

In 2005, the New York High Speed Rail Task Force estimated that upgrading the track in the Empire Corridor between New York City and Buffalo—a small portion of which currently supports 110-mph trains but most of which is limited to 79 mph—to 110-mph standards (with a small portion as fast as 125 mph) would cost \$1.8 billion, or \$3.9 million per mile.¹⁸

New tracks are far more expensive. In 2005, the Florida High Speed Rail Authority estimated that a new 92-mile line capable of running gas-turbine trains at 125 mph between

Tampa and Orlando would cost about \$2.05 billion to \$2.47 billion, or \$22 million to \$27 million per mile.¹⁹

In 2008, the California High-Speed Rail Authority estimated that a 490-mile initial segment from San Francisco to Anaheim would cost \$33 billion, or about \$67 million a mile.²⁰ At this average rate, planned branches to Sacramento, Riverside, and San Diego would cost another \$19 billion. These costs are higher than Florida’s due to more mountainous terrain, the extra infrastructure required for electric-powered trains, and California’s desire to run trains at 220 mph instead of 125 mph.

Even accounting for the current recession, construction costs have grown significantly since some of these estimates were made. In much of the country, construction costs have increased by nearly 50 percent since 2004.²¹ To be conservative, this paper will assume that costs estimated in 2004 have increased by 35 percent and costs estimated in 2005 have increased by 25 percent. Based on the estimates for the Midwest corridor, upgrading track to support 110-mph trains will cost \$3.5 million per mile. If applied to the Federal Railroad Administration’s entire 8,500-mile system, that would total to nearly \$30 billion, or close to four times the amount of money Congress has approved for high-speed rail.

However, some places are not satisfied with 110-mph trains. California voters approved a \$9 billion down payment on its

Table 2: Estimated Costs of High-Speed Rail by Corridor (Billions of dollars)

	FRA Plan		Amended Plan	
	Miles	Cost	Miles	Cost
California	785	\$52.0	785	\$52.0
Empire	440	2.1	440	2.1
Florida	355	11.1	355	11.1
Gulf Coast	940	3.3	1,020	3.6
Keystone	350	1.2	350	1.2
Midwest	2,190	7.7	3,150	11.0
New England	705	2.5	705	2.5
Pacific Northwest	465	1.6	465	1.6
South Central	915	3.2	1,235	4.3
Southeast	1,490	5.2	1,630	5.7
Rocky Mountain	0	0.0	950	3.3
Las Vegas	0	0.0	250	0.9
Total	8,635	\$89.9	11,335	\$98.6

The amended network includes frequently mentioned high-speed rail corridors left out of the FRA plan, including Dallas-Houston, Jacksonville-Orlando, Los Angeles-Las Vegas, and Albuquerque-Cheyenne.

\$33 billion trunk line from San Francisco to Los Angeles, and the state's rail authority fully expects the federal government to pay half of the total cost. Florida's 125-mph Orlando-Tampa line is only one-quarter of the Miami-Orlando-Tampa route in the FRA plan. Assuming an average cost of \$31 million a mile (the midpoint between \$22 and \$27 adjusted for recent increases in construction costs), this entire line will cost more than \$11 billion (table 2).

At minimum, then, the FRA plan will cost about \$90 billion. About 90 million people file federal income tax forms and pay income taxes each year, so the FRA plan will cost each income tax payer about \$1,000.²²

That's only the beginning. The 8,500-mile system proposed by the FRA has some significant gaps. The Midwest High-Speed Rail Initiative proposed several hundred miles of routes not included in the FRA plan. Other notable absences include proposed lines from Dallas to Houston, Jacksonville to Orlando, and Los Angeles to Las Vegas. Altogether, these represent about 1,750 route miles whose cost, if brought to 110-mph standards, would be \$6.1 billion.

The costs are not likely to stop there. The 8,500-mile FRA network only reaches 33 states. Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, and Tennessee are among the fast-growing states left out of the network, and every excluded state is represented by senators and representatives who will wonder why their constituents have to pay for rail lines that only serve other states.

A particularly large hole in the system can be found in the Rocky Mountains, which are ignored by the FRA plan even though Phoenix and Denver are two of America's largest urban areas. Although Congress authorized the FRA to designate 11 high-speed rail corridors, it has identified only 10. The Rocky Mountain Rail Authority, which is funded by the Colorado Department of Transportation, has proposed an 11th corridor consisting of a high-speed line from Albuquerque to Cheyenne and extending west to Grand Junction, Aspen, and Craig, Colorado.²³ At 110-mph standards, that adds another \$3.3 billion.

These additions bring the total to nearly \$100 billion. For comparison, the Interstate Highway System cost about \$425 billion after adjusting for inflation to today's dollars.²⁴

More than half of the total cost of the FRA plan is for the California lines, which make up less than 10 percent of the route miles. For this reason, the California High-Speed Rail Authority believes it has "every right to think we would receive the lion's share of the" \$8 billion Congress has approved for high-speed rail.²⁵ However, if California does receive a significant share of federal funds, elected officials

from other states are likely to demand that the federal government build them true high-speed lines as well.

As if to forestall this possibility, Amtrak's President Joseph Boardman told Illinois legislators in May 2009 that a complete network of true high-speed rail lines would be "prohibitively expensive."²⁶ But people in the Midwest, Texas, and other places are likely to ask, "Why is it prohibitively expensive for us to have true high-speed rail, but not California?"

For example, most proposals for Texas, Las Vegas, and Rocky Mountain corridors call for true high-speed rail. Based on estimates in the California plan, building the entire network to true high-speed rail standards would cost between \$550 billion and \$700 billion.²⁷ Adding service to some or all of the 13 other states not included in the FRA plan will drive the cost even higher.

Of course, once high-speed rail is built to trendy cities all over the country, they will want the federal government to help them build streetcars and light-rail lines so high-speed rail travelers won't have to sully themselves by riding buses or taxis to their final destinations. Light rail and streetcars are, after all, a part of the administration's "livability" agenda. This will add hundreds of billions to the cost of the nation's passenger rail system.

All politics is local, meaning every member of Congress will want a piece of the high-speed rail pie. So initial funding of \$8 billion effectively commits the nation to a \$99 billion program, which eventually turns into a \$700 billion program, whose actual costs eventually exceed \$1 trillion. This doesn't even count cost overruns, operating subsidies, and rail rehabilitation every 30 or so years.

Cost overruns are almost a certainty with large-scale public works projects, partly because project proponents tend to offer initially low cost estimates in order to gain public acceptance. Danish planning professor Bent Flyvbjerg argues that megaproject cost estimates should be increased by the proportion by which similar projects have gone over their originally projected budgets.²⁸ No high-speed rail line has ever been built from scratch in the United States, but historically, urban passenger rail projects have gone an average of 40 percent over their projected costs.²⁹

Despite optimistic forecasts by rail proponents, passenger fares will rarely if ever cover high-speed operating costs. Amtrak operations currently cost federal and state taxpayers more than \$1 billion per year.³⁰ According to the bipartisan Amtrak Reform Council, Amtrak's trains between Boston and Washington lost nearly \$2.30 per passenger in 2001.³¹ If trains in the most heavily populated corridor in the United States cannot cover their costs, no other trains will come close.

The Amtrak Reform Council also estimated that 110-mph trains between Chicago and Detroit lost \$72 per passenger; 110-mph trains between New York and Albany lost \$28 per passenger; and 90-mph trains between Los Angeles and San Diego lost \$28 per passenger. Outside of the Boston-to-Washington and Philadelphia-to-Harrisburg routes, Amtrak short-distance trains lost an average of \$37 per passenger.³² Amtrak typically expects the states to cover most of the operating losses in regional corridors.

Another hidden cost of rail transportation is that rail lines must be largely and expensively rebuilt about every 30 years. The Federal Transit Administration recently estimated that the nation's older rail transit systems are suffering from a \$50 billion backlog of unfunded maintenance needs.³³ Congress tends to fund "ribbons, not brooms"—that is, to fund new projects (over which they can cut ribbons) instead of maintaining existing projects. This means construction of moderate- or high-speed rail lines could leave states obligated to fund billions of dollars of rehabilitation costs.

What will American taxpayers get for this money? To answer that question, it is important to scrutinize the highly touted high-speed trains in Europe and Japan.

BULLET TRAINS TO BANKRUPTCY

In 1964, Japanese National Railways began operating the world's first high-speed train, the 135-mph Tokaido Shinkansen, or bullet train, between Tokyo and Osaka. This is also the only high-speed train in the world that has paid for itself, and for good reasons.

First, it was built across flat land at a time when Japan's property values and construction costs were far lower than today. The total cost of the 320-mile line was ¥380 billion, which (adjusting for inflation) is about \$17 billion or \$53 million per mile.³⁴

More important, the Tokaido line connects three of the world's largest and densest metropolitan areas: Tokyo, with 21 million people in 1965, 33 million today; Osaka, with 13 million in 1965, 17 million today; and Nagoya, with 6 million people in 1965, 9 million today.³⁵ Few other places in the developed world have such concentrations of people located a few hundred miles apart.

Furthermore, in the early 1960s, Japan did not have the problem of attracting people out of their automobiles. As of 1960, when Shinkansen construction began, trains provided 77 percent of all passenger travel while autos provided just 5 percent.³⁶ Instead, the problem was keeping people from buying and driving autos—and in this, the Shinkansen failed miserably. Between 1965 and 2005, per-capita driving increased by more than 900 percent, while per-capita rail travel increased by a meager 19 percent.

Although the Tokaido line earned a profit, subsequent Shinkansen did not. In 1960, the Japanese National Railways was a government-owned corporation that actually made money. But the success of the Tokaido line led politicians in other, less-densely populated parts of Japan to demand that the company build more high-speed trains to their regions. For example, when Kakuei Tanaka (who was later convicted of accepting a bribe) was prime minister, he made sure that a high-speed rail line was built into the prefecture he represented, though the line, says the University of Arizona's Louis Hayes, "served very few passengers."³⁷

High-speed trains "took on a life of their own as the ultimate pork barrel beloved of politicians," writes an American now living in Japan, "with the result that gigantic new lines continue to expand across the nation regardless of economic need or environmental impact."³⁸ To date, at least eight other lines have been built, each more expensive and serving fewer people than the last.

For example, the 167-mile Joetsu line between Omiya and Niigata—cities of less than half a million people each—cost ¥1.7 trillion, which (adjusting for inflation) is more than \$140 million per mile. Even worse was the 73-mile Nagano line between Takasaki and Nagano, each smaller than 350,000 people. It was built through the mountains at a cost of ¥8.4 trillion, which works out to more than a billion dollars per mile!³⁹

These and other politically driven losses put the Japanese National Railways in the red for the first time in its history. JNR responded by raising passenger fares, but this only pushed more people off trains and into automobiles. Despite—or because of—the bullet trains, auto travel surpassed rail travel in 1977.

By 1987, expansion of bullet-train service and other below-cost operations had swelled Japanese National Railways' debt to more than \$350 billion.⁴⁰ (By comparison, General Motors' debt shortly before its bankruptcy was \$35 billion.⁴¹) This led to a financial crisis that significantly contributed to the nation's economic woes of the last two decades. To understand this crisis, it is important to understand Japan's corporate system, which seemed unbeatable in the 1980s.

While American investors traditionally judge a company by its profits, Japanese investors judged companies based on their assets. This created an asset bubble and credit crisis that led to Japan's "lost decade"—now on the verge of becoming two lost decades.

Japan effectively created urban-growth boundaries around cities with a 150 percent tax on short-term capital gains of land improvements.⁴² This drove up land prices in

the cities, increasing the asset value of corporations that owned that land. By the 1980s, most of the assets of major corporations were in the land they owned, not in the things they produced. Even such major companies as Toyota and Sharp were earning more profits on land speculation than on manufacturing.⁴³

This created a dangerous feedback loop: As land prices increased, company assets grew and so did stock prices. Companies issued more stock to buy more land, pushing up land prices still further. Eventually, Japanese real estate was supposedly worth four times the entire United States, and the land in the Imperial Palace in Tokyo was estimated to be worth more than all the real estate in California.⁴⁴

In this situation, the \$350 billion debt of the Japanese National Railways did not seem unreasonable, as the company owned lots of land that was supposedly worth at least that much money. But assets do not pay mortgages, and by 1987 the railroad was in virtual bankruptcy because it could not meet its interest payments.

The government's solution was to privatize the company. Selling the railway lines did not come close to covering the debt. In particular, the government sold the then-operating Shinkansen lines for less than half a penny for every dollar spent building them, even without adjusting for inflation.⁴⁵

The government expected to make up the difference by selling land owned by the railway company. But soon it realized that putting that much land on the market would burst the real estate bubble, which in turn would shake the very foundations of the Japanese economy. So the government decided to absorb the remaining debt. As it turned out, deciding not to sell the land out of a fear it would burst the bubble had the effect of bursting the bubble anyway, and by 1991 Japan's economy was in shambles.

The government's solution to the economic crisis was to stimulate the economy by building things such as more Shinkansen lines.⁴⁶ Newer lines have been built at government expense and leased to the private railway companies at rates that will never recover the construction costs.⁴⁷ The subsidy to new construction in 2008 alone was ¥307 billion, or almost \$30 billion.⁴⁸ However, this policy has failed to bring about economic recovery, and Japan is still in the doldrums.

Meanwhile, as attractive as the bullet trains are to American tourists, residents of Japan hardly use them. Japanese travel by train more than the people of any other nation in the world—about 1,950 miles per person per year. But high-speed rail carries only about 20 percent of that travel, or less than 400 miles per person.⁴⁹ Japanese travel as much

on domestic airlines and almost as much by bus as by high-speed rail, and they travel by car (including tiny cars known as “light motor vehicles”) ten times as many miles per year as by high-speed rail.

HIGH-SPEED FAIL IN EUROPE

Inspired by the Shinkansen, Italy introduced the high-speed train to Europe in 1978 with its 160-mph *Direttissima* between Rome and Florence. France followed with the Paris-Lyon *train à grande vitesse* (TGV) of the same speed in 1981. Germany and other countries followed a few years later, and today nine of the EU-15—the fifteen western European countries that made up the European Union in 2000—have some form of high-speed rail.

Since then, France has been the European leader of the high-speed rail movement and is now running trains with top speeds of 185 mph. French trains carry 54 percent of Europe's high-speed rail passenger-kilometers, followed by Germany at 26 percent, and Italy at 10 percent. More than half of all rail travel in France is on high-speed trains, but three out of four rail passengers in the EU-15 still travel at conventional speeds.

American tourists who visit Europe and ride the TGV, the Paris metro, Germany's ICE trains, or the London underground often come home wishing the United States had a similar transportation system. Of course, the United States isn't Europe: our population densities are lower, and our incomes are higher, so fewer people would ride transit even in dense areas.

More important, Europe isn't Europe either, at least not the Europe that many Americans fantasize about. For example, as of 2007, at least 150 European urban areas had some form of rail transit, compared with just 30 in the United States.⁵⁰ Yet the average resident of the EU-15 travels just 95 miles per year on urban rail transit, compared with 87 for the average American.⁵¹ This trivial difference hardly justifies the huge amount Europe spends subsidizing urban transit.⁵²

Table 4: Freight Travel Mix in 2004

	EU-25	United States	Japan
Air	0.1%	0.4%	0.2%
Highway	72.5%	28.2%	59.9%
Rail	16.5%	37.9%	4.0%
Pipeline	5.5%	20.6%	0.0%
Waterway	5.4%	12.9%	35.9%

⁵⁰“Air” is limited to domestic (within EU-25 in Europe) travel; “auto” includes motorcycles; “bus” includes both intercity and urban buses; “rail” includes both intercity and urban rail. Source: *Panorama of Transport* (Brussels, BE: European Commission, 2007), p. 103.

Europeans ride high-speed rail more than Americans, but not a lot more. In 2004, the average resident of the EU-15 rode high-speed rail about 125 miles, compared with about 10 miles for the average American. That is 12 times as much, but the 115-mile difference is insignificant compared with total annual EU-15 travel of more than 9,000 miles per person.⁵³ Residents of the EU-15 fly domestically (that is, within Europe) more than eight times as many miles each year, take buses more than five times as many miles, and drive more than 50 times as many miles as they ride high-speed rail.⁵⁴

Though France has Europe’s best-developed high-speed rail network, the average resident of France rides high-speed rail less than 400 miles per year, about the same as the average Japanese. The French travel more than the Japanese (or most other Europeans), so high-speed rail carries less than 4 percent of French passenger travel.⁵⁵

Just as in Japan, high-speed rail has not perceptibly slowed the growth of auto driving in Europe. In 1980, when only a few high-speed rail lines were in operation, intercity rail accounted for 8.2 percent of passenger travel in the EU-15. By 2000, it had declined to 6.3 percent, and has continued to decline since then. Meanwhile, the share of European travel using automobiles increased from 76.4 percent to 78.3 percent and the share flying increased from 2.5 to 5.8 percent.⁵⁶

Rail’s declining importance in Europe has come about despite onerous taxes on driving and huge subsidies to rail transportation. Much of the revenue from those taxes is effectively used to subsidize rail. “Rail is heavily subsidized,” says French economist Rémy Prud’Homme, adding that taxpayers “pay about half the total cost of providing the service.” Prud’Homme estimates that rail service in the EU-15 receives about 68 billion euros—or about \$100 billion—of subsidies each year.⁵⁷

Nor has the introduction of new high-speed rail service helped relieve highway congestion. “Not a single high-speed track built to date has had any perceptible impact on the road traffic carried by parallel motorways,” says Ari Vatanen, a member of the European Parliament.⁵⁸ However, the introduction of subsidized high-speed rail has caused some for-profit airlines to end service on parallel routes, which should hardly be a cause for joy.⁵⁹

Europe’s passenger travel mix is similar to that of the United States (table 3). The big difference is that European intercity rail carries a 5.8 percent share of the travel market compared with Amtrak’s 0.1 percent. But it is not even clear that this is due to the massive subsidies Europe is pouring into high-speed rail, since rail’s percentage is steadily declining despite those subsidies. Instead, it may be that Europe’s lower

incomes and high taxes on autos and fuel has simply slowed the growth of driving. European planners predict that rail and bus’s combined share will continue to decline between now and 2030.⁶⁰

Table 3: Passenger Travel Mix in 2004

	EU-25	United States	Japan
Air	8.3%	10.8%	6.3%
Auto	76.3%	86.2%	57.5%
Bus	8.6%	2.7%	6.5%
Rail	5.8%	0.3%	29.3%
Water	0.8%	0.0%	0.3%

“Water” includes domestic shipping only. Source: National Transportation Statistics (Washington, DC: Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2008), table 1-46b; Panorama of Transport (Brussels, BE: European Commission, 2007), p. 69.

On the other hand, in both Europe and Japan, the emphasis on using rails for moving passengers has had a profound effect on the movement of freight. While a little more than a quarter of American freight goes on the highway and well over a third goes by rail, nearly three-fourths of European freight goes on the road and just one-sixth goes by rail (table 4). Moreover, rail’s share of freight movement is declining in Europe—it was 22 percent in 1980—while it increased in the United States from 27 percent in 1980 to 40 percent in 2006.⁶¹

Rail’s poor performance at carrying freight in both Japan and Europe suggests that Obama’s hope of getting both people and freight off the highways and onto trains may be a pipe dream; a country or region can apparently use its rail system for passengers or freight, but not both. The fact that American freight railroads are profitable while European passenger lines are not suggests that freight, not passenger, is the highest and best use of a modern railroad in most places. Spending tens of billions of dollars per year on passenger rail might get a small percentage of cars off the road—but one possible consequence is to greatly increase the number of trucks on the road.

THE ENVIRONMENTAL COST OF HIGH-SPEED RAIL

When announcing his high-speed rail vision, President Obama promised high-speed rail would provide “clean, energy-efficient transportation.”⁶² Many people take it for granted that trains use significantly less energy and produce less pollution and greenhouse gas emissions than other forms of travel. In fact, however, passenger rail’s environmental benefits are negligible and costly.

Automobiles consume a huge amount of energy, but that’s because they provide so much travel: more than 4

trillion passenger miles a year, and about 85 percent of all passenger travel in the United States. When considered on a per-passenger-mile basis, automobiles are very close to passenger trains.

Many analyses presume that the average auto on the road carries 1.6 people, and based on this Amtrak is more energy efficient than cars. In fact, 1.6 people per car is an average of urban and intercity travel, while intercity autos tend to carry more people. An independent analysis for the California High-Speed Rail Authority found that intercity autos average 2.4 people.⁶³

At 2.4 people per vehicle, Amtrak is only 8 percent more energy efficient than light trucks and 15 percent *less* energy efficient than cars (table 5). Amtrak doesn't come close to fuel-efficient cars like the Toyota Prius, even one carrying only 1.6 people.

As an analysis by the Department of Energy concluded, "intercity auto trips tend to be relatively efficient highway trips with higher-than-average vehicle occupancy rates—on average, they are as energy-efficient as rail intercity trips."⁶⁴ If we really wanted to save energy using mass transportation, intercity buses use far less energy per passenger mile than passenger trains.

Not only are autos as energy-efficient as Amtrak today, long-term trends favor autos and airlines over trains. Since 1975, airline have cut the energy they use per passenger mile by more than half, while Amtrak's energy efficiency

Table 5: 2006 Energy Consumption and CO₂ Emissions Per Passenger Mile

	BTUs	Pounds CO ₂
Light trucks (1.73 people)	3,990	0.63
Cars (1.57 people)	3,512	0.55
Light trucks (2.4 people)	2,876	0.45
Cars (2.4 people)	2,297	0.36
Airlines	3,228	0.50
Amtrak	2,650	0.43
Prius (1.57 people)	1,659	0.26
Prius (2.4 people)	1,085	0.17
Intercity bus	200	0.03

Sources: BTUs from Stacy C. Davis and Susan W. Diegel, *Transportation Energy Data Book: Edition 27* (Oak Ridge, TN: Department of Energy, 2008), tables 2.12, 2.13, and 2.14; CO₂ calculations based on coefficients from Energy Information Administration, "Fuel and Energy Emission Coefficients," (Washington: Department of Energy), tinyurl.com/smdrm; Prius information from Environmental Protection Agency, *Model Year 2008 Fuel Economy Guide* (Washington: EPA, 2007), tinyurl.com/25y3ce.

Table 6: Improvements in Energy Efficiency Through 2006

	Since 1975	Since 1985
Passenger Cars	25.8%	14.5%
Light Trucks	41.9%	20.9%
Airlines	58.8%	36.1%
Amtrak	25.3%	2.0%

Source: Stacy C. Davis and Susan W. Diegel, *Transportation Energy Data Book: Edition 27* (Oak Ridge, TN: Department of Energy, 2008), tables 2.13 and 2.14.

has grown by just 25 percent (table 6). Automobile energy efficiencies grew rapidly when gas prices were high, more slowly when prices were low. But even when prices were low, auto manufacturers improved the energy efficiencies of engines so that the number of ton-miles per gallon continued to increase.⁶⁵

Both the airline industry and auto manufacturers expect their energy efficiencies to continue to increase. Boeing promises its 787 plane will be 20 percent more fuel efficient than comparable planes today.⁶⁶ Jet engine makers expect to double fuel efficiency by 2020.⁶⁷ Automakers signed on to President Obama's 2016 fuel-efficiency targets.⁶⁸ If they meet those targets, the average cars and light trucks on the road in 2025 will be 30 percent more energy efficient than they are today, even if the fuel-efficiencies of new cars do not increase after 2016.⁶⁹

Steven Polzin, of the University of South Florida's Center for Urban Transportation Research, points out that autos and buses have relatively short life cycles, so they can readily adapt to the need to save energy or reduce pollution. Rail systems "may be far more difficult or expensive to upgrade to newer, more efficient technologies," Polzin adds.⁷⁰

In other words, the American auto fleet almost completely turns over every 18 years, and the airline fleet turns over every 21 years, so both can quickly become more fuel-efficient. But builders of rail lines are stuck with whatever technology they select for at least three to four decades. This means that any energy comparisons of moderate- or high-speed rail with air or auto travel must compare rails with airline or auto efficiencies in 15 to 20 years, not those today.

It is unlikely that moderate-speed train operations will save any energy at all. Such trains will mostly be Diesel-powered, and increasing speeds from 79 to 110 mph will significantly increase the energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions of those trains. Saving energy requires that trains accelerate slowly and coast into stations rather than brake heavily, but such practices reduce the timesavings offered by higher top speeds.

True high-speed trains save energy by using lighter equipment, but the energy cost of higher speeds partly offsets the savings from hauling less weight. Any remaining operational savings are not likely to be sufficient to recover the huge amounts of energy consumed and greenhouse gases released during construction of new rail lines.⁷¹

After studying high-speed rail proposals in Britain, Professor Roger Kemp of Lancaster University concluded that the construction costs dwarf any savings in operations unless the rail lines are used to their full capacity.⁷² With a round-the-clock average of just one train an hour in each direction, and no more than two trains a hour during the busiest times of day, even Amtrak's New York-to-Washington corridor is far from full capacity.

Electrically powered high-speed trains produce less greenhouse gases only if that electricity is generated from renewable power sources. Most electricity in the U.S. comes from fossil fuels, with the result that urban rail transit systems in such cities as Baltimore, Denver, Cleveland, Miami, and Washington generate as much or more greenhouse gases, per passenger mile, as driving an SUV, much less an ordinary car.⁷³

It is far more cost-effective to save energy by encouraging people to drive more fuel-efficient cars than to build and operate high-speed rail. Moreover, in places that do generate electricity from renewable sources, it would be more cost-effective to use that electricity to power electric or plug-in hybrid cars than high-speed rail.

Given all these facts, the Florida High Speed Rail Authority concluded that "the environmentally preferred alternative is the No Build Alternative" because it "would result in less direct and indirect impact to the environment."⁷⁴ An objective analysis of other high-speed rail proposals would reach the same conclusion.

Such analyses are rarely objective, however. The California High-Speed Rail Authority claims that high-speed rail would save energy and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.⁷⁵ But these claims are based on highly optimistic assumptions for rail and pessimistic assumptions for autos and airlines:

- The Los Angeles-to-San Francisco line would carry more than more than three times as many passengers in 2025 as Amtrak now carries in the Boston-to-Washington corridor, even though that corridor serves more people than the California corridor is expected to have in 2025;⁷⁶
- Neither automobiles nor airplanes will become more energy efficient or cleaner than they are today;⁷⁷

- The authority never mentions the energy and pollution cost of replacing trains and reconstructing track and electrical facilities every 30 years;
- The authority calculates the energy cost of building high-speed rail, but not the greenhouse gas emissions.

These assumptions are all examples of what Danish planning professor Bent Flyvbjerg calls "optimism bias."⁷⁸ Such bias, says Flyvbjerg, typically afflicts proponents of megaprojects, which is why large public works projects almost inevitably cost more and produce smaller benefits than originally promised.

Based on these optimistic assumptions, the authority estimates that operational energy savings will repay the energy cost of building high-speed rail in 13 years, after which the rail line will save 11.75 trillion British thermal units (BTUs) per year.⁷⁹ The rail line is also projected to save 7.5 million metric tons of carbon dioxide emissions per year, or about 1.4 percent of the state's projected output in 2025.⁸⁰

Even with these optimistic assumptions, high-speed rail reduces corridor transportation energy consumption by only 8.3 percent. This means the operational energy and greenhouse gas savings fall to zero if we assume instead that automobiles and airplanes are, by 2025, just 8.3 percent more energy efficient than they are today. If automakers meet Obama's fuel-efficiency standards, autos will be more than 30 percent more efficient in 2025 than they are today, so high-speed rail will actually be wasting energy.

Meanwhile, the FRA's high-speed rail vision claimed that its plan would reduce carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions by 6 billion pounds per year.⁸¹ The first clue that there is something wrong with this number is the fact that it is expressed in pounds instead of metric tons, which are the more usual unit for national CO₂ emissions. In 2007, energy-related CO₂ emissions in the United States totaled 6.0 trillion metric tons, of which 6 billion pounds, or 2.7 million metric tons, represents less than 0.05 percent.⁸²

The second clue something is wrong with the claimed 6 billion pounds is that the number came from a study by the pro-rail Center for Clean Air Policy and Center for Neighborhood Technology. Without documentation or attribution, the report's first paragraph claims that high-speed rail "can reduce congestion on roads and at airports, is cost effective and convenient, improves mobility and has environmental benefits."⁸³ This is hardly a sign of objectivity.

To calculate the annual CO₂ savings of the FRA plan, this study made the following questionable assumptions:

- “Relatively low fuel prices and a continuing trend of drivers switching to sport utility vehicles” means that the average car on the road in 2025 will get 23 miles per gallon (compared with about 20 mpg today).⁸⁴ Under Obama’s new fuel-economy standards, however, the average car on the road in 2025 will get almost 30 mpg.⁸⁵
- The average automobile on the road carries 1.6 people.⁸⁶ As previously noted, occupancies for the intercity travel with which high-speed rail will compete are closer to 2.4.
- For rail vehicles, the study assumed Amtrak would replace its existing Diesel trains with a Danish Diesel whose top speed is only 99 mph.⁸⁷ Since most FRA routes call for trains going up to 110 mph, and energy consumption is very sensitive to speed, this was the wrong choice.
- The study relied on optimistic rail ridership assumptions, including California’s 32 million trips (plus 10 million more “high-speed commuter” trips) per year. In the Pacific Northwest corridor, for example, the study optimistically assumed that raising top speeds from 79 mph to 99 mph would boost annual ridership from its current level of less than 1 million trips per year to 3.2 million per year.⁸⁸
- The study counted only operational emissions, implicitly assuming that emissions from construction (and periodic reconstruction) of high-speed rail would be zero.

In addition, nearly 1 million pounds of the projected annual reduction of CO₂ came from the Northeast Corridor, which is not part of the FRA plan and so should have been deducted by the FRA in its announcement.⁸⁹ That means the plan itself is projected to save only 2.3 million metric tons per year.

In the unlikely event that all of these assumptions turn out to be correct and high-speed rail does save 2.3 million metric tons of CO₂ per year, it is still not a cost-effective way of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. McKinsey & Company estimates the United States can cut its greenhouse gas emissions in half by 2030 by investing in technologies that cost no more than \$50 per metric ton of abated emissions. Many technologies, McKinsey reported, would actually save money because the fuel savings would repay the capital investment. Significantly, none of the technologies that McKinsey considered cost-effective had anything to do with urban transit or intercity rail, through several included improvements in automobile designs.⁹⁰

If the FRA high-speed rail plan costs \$90 billion, as estimated in table 2, then the annualized cost will be about \$7.2 billion plus operational subsidies.⁹¹ This means high-speed rail will cost more than \$3,100 per ton of abated greenhouse gas emissions. For every ton abated, more than 60 tons of abatement would be foregone because the money was not invested in programs that could reduce CO₂ at a cost of \$50 a ton or less. Correcting any of the study’s assumptions, of course, would significantly reduce CO₂ savings and increase the cost per ton of CO₂ abated. (For comparison, estimates of the cost of CO₂ abated by the California high-speed rail project range from \$2,000 to \$10,000 per ton.⁹²)

When considering the energy required for construction and reconstruction of high-speed rail lines, improvements in auto and airline energy efficiencies, and the high energy cost required to move trains at higher speeds, it appears unlikely that high-speed rail will have any environmental benefits at all. Instead of trying to change people’s lifestyles, the nation will do better by making existing lifestyles more energy efficient and environmentally friendly. That is not, however, the Obama plan.

REGULATING PROPERTY RIGHTS

High-speed rail is only one part of the Obama administration’s “livability” campaign to completely reshape American lifestyles. In addition to high-speed rail, this program includes more urban transit (particularly rail transit), bicycle and walking paths, encouraging high-density housing, discouraging single-family housing, and discouraging driving. As Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood recently admitted, the ultimate purpose of this campaign is to “coerce people out of their cars.”⁹³

Despite the terms “livability” and “smart growth,” unless you are rich, athletic, and have no children, however, they create cities that are neither smart nor livable. Even though there are far more effective and less expensive ways to reduce the environmental costs of driving, smart growth is accepted without question by many policy-makers, reporters, and urban leaders.

High-speed rail contributes to the livability agenda by providing people with a supposedly environmentally friendly alternative to driving for intercity travel. But proponents believe high-speed rail will attract more riders if people also live in higher density urban areas. Many cities in California, Oregon, and a few other states have attempted to increase densities through the use of urban-growth boundaries, greenbelts, and similar techniques.⁹⁴

In March 2009, the secretaries of Transportation and Housing and Urban Development agreed to promote “sustainable communities,” by which by they mean denser

communities. The two departments “will help metropolitan areas set a vision for growth and apply federal transportation, housing and other investments in an integrated approach to support that vision.”⁹⁵ Such “visioning” inevitably means more multi-family housing, fewer new single-family homes, more mass transit, and less congestion relief for motorists. Through the process of distributing federal transportation and housing funds, these ideas will be imposed on the nation’s 385 metropolitan areas.

Such density programs are already a requirement for urban areas obtaining federal funds for urban rail transit. Under Federal Transit Administration policies, urban areas with strong “transit supportive land-use policies” are more likely to get federal funds.⁹⁶ It seems likely that similar requirements will be imposed on cities and states receiving high-speed rail funding.

At minimum, this means rezoning areas near rail stations to much higher densities. To achieve such densities, places such as Portland use minimum-density zoning: if someone’s house burns down, they cannot simply replace it; they must build to the zoned density.

The administration, however, will pressure metropolitan areas to go far beyond such local rezoning by adopting regional plans that use urban-growth boundaries or similar tools to limit construction of single-family homes. Owners of property outside the boundary will be prohibited from developing their land; in Oregon, rural landowners cannot even build a house on their own land unless they own 80 acres and earn \$40,000 to \$80,000 a year (depending on soil productivity) from farming it. Inside the boundary, property owners will earn windfall profits as land prices rise, but neighborhood characters will dramatically change as developers replace single-family homes with mid-rise or high-rise apartments and condominiums.

The experiences of cities that have adopted these policies reveal two things. First, such policies do not significantly reduce driving. Second, the policies impose very high costs on the cities and urban areas that adopt them.

Within the range of densities found in American urban areas, density alone has trivial effects on the amount of driving people do. Statistically, the correlation between changes in urban densities and changes in per-capita driving is very low, and to the extent there is a correlation, a doubling of urban densities reduces per-capita driving by just 3.4 percent.⁹⁷

Nor do so-called transit-oriented developments—high-density, mixed-use developments near transit stations—significantly reduce driving. To the extent that people living in these developments drive less than others, it is because

those people want to drive less so they decided to live near a transit line. After that market has been saturated, however, people living in such developments tend to drive as much as anyone else. Surveys have found that people living in Portland-area transit-oriented developments do not use transit significantly more than people in other Portland neighborhoods.⁹⁸ Similar results have been found with transit-oriented developments in other cities.⁹⁹

The failure of these policies to have much of an effect on driving might not be important were it not for the fact that the policies impose huge costs on urban residents. Numerous surveys show that the vast majority of Americans say they want to live in a single-family home with a yard.¹⁰⁰ Yet livability policies deliberately make this housing unaffordable to low- and even middle-income families.¹⁰¹

Indeed, the housing bubble that led to the recent economic crisis was almost exclusively in states and urban areas that use smart growth or some other form of growth-management planning.¹⁰² Not coincidentally, a similar property bubble led to Japan’s economic crisis in 1990. The administration’s livability policies are likely to make America’s next housing bubble even worse than the recent one.

A second cost is the higher taxes, or declining urban services, that residents must pay in order to subsidize rail transit and transit-oriented developments. Portland, for example, has spent more than \$2 billion on rail transit and nearly \$2 billion subsidizing developments near transit stations. A large share of these subsidies has come from tax-increment financing, meaning property taxes that would otherwise go to schools, fire, police, and other essential services. These programs have all suffered major budget cuts so that the city can continue to subsidize its rail fantasies.¹⁰³

Portland’s density policies and rail transit have done little to change the region’s travel patterns. For example, between 2000 and 2007, Portland opened two new light-rail lines and a streetcar line. By 2007, high fuel prices supposedly meant less driving and booming transit ridership.

Yet census figures show that, between 2000 and 2007, the number of Portland-area commuters who usually take a car to work increased from 664,300 to 730,500, meaning roughly 60,000 more cars going to work each day. Meanwhile, the number of commuters who usually take transit to work actually declined slightly from 58,600 to 57,900.¹⁰⁴ These numbers are supported by censuses of downtown employers showing that the number of downtown workers taking transit to work declined between 2001 and 2007.¹⁰⁵

Partly at the expense of transit commuting, Portland has seen an increase in the number of people walking and cycling to

work. The downtown censuses found a 50 percent increase in commuters walking to work and a 100 percent increase in cyclists between 2001 and 2007. The regional census found more than a doubling of cyclists, but only a 3 percent increase in walking commuters, between 2000 and 2007.

What is happening is that Portland's policies have led to a sorting of the population. Subsidized but expensive inner-city housing is increasingly occupied by young singles and childless couples, while lower- and middle-income families with children are pushed out to or beyond the region's periphery.

The diaspora of low-income families from inner-city neighborhoods to suburban areas—often into subsidized high-density housing along transit lines—has been well documented by a smart-growth group called the Coalition for a Livable Future.¹⁰⁶ Portland's school district is painfully aware of the loss of families with children: even though the city of Portland's population is twice what it was in 1928, it has fewer school-age children.¹⁰⁷ Meanwhile, families with children have moved to such places as Vancouver, Washington, which is outside of Portland's urban-growth boundary, and Salem, Oregon, which has a less-restrictive urban-growth boundary than Portland's.

What this means is that enough young, athletic commuters live in relatively high-priced housing close to downtown that bicycling has increased—at the expense of a loss of community diversity. While many more bicycles can be seen downtown than in the past, regionally the increase in bicycle commuting has only been from 0.9 to 1.8 percent.

BANKERS, LAWYERS, AND BUREAUCRATS

Amtrak carries between 5 billion and 6 billion passenger miles each year, which is roughly 0.1 percent of all passenger travel in the United States.¹⁰⁸ The optimistic analysis prepared by the Center for Clean Air Policy predicts that, if the FRA high-speed rail plan is completed before 2025, it would carry 25.5 billion passenger miles per year (5.5 billion of which would be taken from conventional Amtrak trains). However, 4.8 billion of these passenger miles would be on the existing Boston-to-Washington corridor, so the FRA plan would increase high-speed rail travel by 20.6 billion passenger miles.¹⁰⁹

The Census Bureau projects that the United States population will be 357 million people in 2025, which means the FRA system will carry each person an average of 58 miles per year.¹¹⁰ In the unlikely event that per-capita driving and flying do not increase, the FRA system would then carry just 0.3 percent of passenger travel.

The Center for Clean Air Policy projects that the average high-speed rail trip will be about 225 miles long, which

means the average American will take a round trip on high-speed trains only once every seven to eight years.

Who will be among the lucky few to enjoy heavily subsidized high-speed train rides? One answer can be found by comparing fares in Amtrak's New York-to-Washington corridor.

At the time of this writing, \$99 will get you from Washington to New York in two hours and 50 minutes on Amtrak's high-speed train, while \$49 pays for a moderate-speed train ride that takes three hours and 15 minutes. Meanwhile, relatively unsubsidized and energy-efficient buses cost \$20 for a four-hour-and-15-minute trip with leather seats, free Wi-Fi, and a choice of several midtown or downtown stops in New York City. Airfares start at \$119 for a one-hour flight.

High-speed rail plans in other parts of the country propose similar fare premiums. Midwest train "fares will be competitive with air travel," says the Midwest High Speed Rail Initiative. Average "fares are estimated to be up to 50 percent higher than current Amtrak fares to reflect improved services."¹¹¹

Few people who pay their own way will spend an extra \$79 to save an hour and 25 minutes of their time. But anyone who values their time that highly would be willing to pay an extra \$20 to save an hour by taking the plane. Rail advocates respond that high-speed trains have an advantage over flying when adding the time it takes to get between downtowns and airports. Security screening also adds to flying time, but if any American high-speed train suffers an incident similar to the March 2004 attacks on trains in Spain, the Transportation Security Administration will probably require screening for high-speed trains as well as airplanes. In addition, less than 8 percent of Americans work downtown.¹¹² Who are they? Bankers, lawyers, and bureaucrats—high-income people who hardly need taxpayer-supported transportation.

A tiny but growing number of people also live in many downtown areas, but these too tend to be wealthy or high-income people able to afford downtown property prices. In short, not only will most taxpayers have to subsidize the rides of the few who take high-speed rail, those subsidies will tend to go mainly to people who are already well off and have plenty of other mobility choices.

STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS

Table 7 (next page) reveals that high-speed rail will have an insignificant effect on the lives of most state residents, except to the extent that they notice their higher tax bills required to pay for it. Outside of Boston-to-Washington, the California corridor is the most heavily populated, and

California wants to build the fastest trains. Yet the state's extremely optimistic projections still show that the average Californian will take a round trip on high-speed rail less than once every two years.

The estimate that rail will remove 4.5 percent of rural traffic from the highways is higher than the California High-Speed Rail Authority itself projects; it estimates rail will reduce traffic on parallel highways by only 3.8 percent.¹¹³ Traffic on rural California freeways grows by about by 1.9 percent per year, so what little congestion relief high-speed rail provides will be gone in two years.¹¹⁴

PM is passenger miles. A significant portion of the stated capital costs will recur every 30 years. Operating costs are annual assuming losses averaging \$28 per passenger. Sources: Route miles estimated using FRA numbers and Google maps. Capital cost estimates for California, Florida, and New York's Empire Corridor are based on state analyses adjusted for recent increases in construction costs, as described above. Elsewhere, capital costs are estimated to average \$3.5 million per mile. Annual operating losses are calculated at \$28 per passenger; actual losses could go much higher but are not likely to be any less.¹¹⁵ 2025 state populations used in per-capita calculations are based on Census Bureau projections.¹¹⁶ The last column estimates intercity highway traffic that would be displaced by high-speed rail by comparing the Center for Clean Air Policy's estimate of vehicle miles displaced by rail with an estimate of 2025 rural vehicle miles traveled in each state. The latter estimate in turn is based on Highway Statistics 2007, table VM-2¹¹⁷, with vehicle miles of driving increased by the projected population growth through 2025. Rural driving is used as a stand-in for intercity driving. Much intercity driving actually takes place in urban areas, so the percentages in the last column are actually an overestimate.

Upgrading the 450 route miles in Ohio's portion of the FRA plan would cost taxpayers nearly \$1.6 billion or \$137 per resident. In the unlikely event that Amtrak can keep losses per passenger as low as those in the New York-Buffalo or Los Angeles-San Diego corridors, Ohio's portion of high-speed rail will have operating losses of \$33 million per year—and that is very optimistic.

Ohio taxpayers will get little for their initial investment of \$137 plus more every year. The average Ohioan will take a round trip on high-speed rail once every 19.5 years. In actual practice, for every Ohio resident who rides high-speed rail once a month, more than 200 Ohioans will never ride it.

ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH-SPEED RAIL

In 1970, the federal Environmental Protection Agency began addressing toxic air pollution in two ways. First, it

encouraged cities to adopt behavioral solutions such as public transit and disincentives to driving aimed at getting people to drive less. Second, it required technical improvements to automobiles such as catalytic converters. The behavioral solutions failed miserably: between 1970 and 2006, total driving increased by 170 percent and per-capita driving nearly doubled.¹¹⁸ The technical solutions, however, were incredibly successful: despite the increase in driving, total automotive emissions of most pollutants declined by well over 50 percent.¹¹⁹

Despite this clear record of success and failure, some people still want to modify behavior in order to change American single-family home and automotive lifestyles. The administration's livability agenda relies almost exclusively on such behavioral solutions, including high-speed rail.

Instead of spending \$90 billion to reduce auto and air travel by three-tenths of a percent, a fraction of that money could reduce the environmental costs of driving and flying by far more. This is an example of what University of California (Irvine) economist Charles Lave called "the Law of Large Proportions," which he defined as "the biggest components matter most."¹²⁰ In this case, it means that, since automobiles are the dominant form of travel, followed by the airlines, small improvements in automobile and aircraft fuel economy and emissions will have a bigger effect on energy consumption and air quality than big changes in mass transportation.

States and cities can make many technical improvements to reduce the environmental effects of driving. Any promotions of mass intercity transportation should focus on buses rather than rail. As table 5 shows, buses have far lower environmental effects than trains and also cost far less to operate.

Following the law of large proportions, however, most efforts should focus on driving rather than promoting mass transportation. The first priority should be to eliminate traffic congestion, which wastes nearly 3 billion gallons of fuel each year.¹²¹ Ending that waste would reduce CO₂ emissions by 25 million metric tons, almost ten times as much as the Center for Clean Air Policy's optimistic projection for high-speed rail. Relieving congestion would also save people time, improve safety, and reduce toxic air pollution.

One low-cost technique for cities to significantly reduce congestion is to coordinate traffic signals. According to the Federal Highway Administration, three out of four traffic signals in the nation are obsolete and poorly coordinated with other signals.¹²²

In 2003, San Jose coordinated 223 traffic signals on the city's most-congested streets at a cost of about \$500,000. Engineers estimate this saved 471,000 gallons of gasoline

Table 7: FRA High-Speed Rail Plan by State

	Route Miles	Cap. Cost millions	Op. Loss millions	Trips millions	PM millions	Trips/ capita	PM/ capita	Hwy. Traffic Displaced
Alabama	235	\$823	\$36	1.3	209	0.27	43	0.2%
Arkansas	145	508	14	0.5	103	0.16	33	0.1%
California	785	52,000	1,176	42.0	12,727	0.95	287	4.5%
Connecticut	65	228	2	0.1	14	0.02	4	0.1%
Florida	385	11,205	98	3.5	138	0.13	5	0.4%
Georgia	510	1,785	37	1.3	305	0.12	27	0.1%
Illinois	360	1,260	86	3.1	494	0.23	37	0.3%
Indiana	530	1,855	127	4.6	733	0.68	110	0.3%
Kentucky	5	18	0	0.0	3	0.00	1	0.0%
Louisiana	280	980	43	1.5	248	0.33	52	0.4%
Maine	50	175	1	0.0	11	0.03	8	0.0%
Massachusetts	215	753	6	0.2	47	0.03	7	0.4%
Michigan	215	753	51	1.8	295	0.17	28	0.1%
Minnesota	30	105	7	0.3	41	0.04	7	0.0%
Mississippi	255	893	39	1.4	226	0.46	74	0.3%
Missouri	250	875	60	2.1	343	0.34	54	0.2%
New Hampshire	115	403	3	0.1	25	0.07	16	0.1%
New York	475	2,323	265	9.5	2,236	0.49	115	0.4%
North Carolina	385	1,348	23	0.8	215	0.07	19	0.1%
Ohio	450	1,575	33	1.2	112	0.10	10	0.0%
Oklahoma	240	840	24	0.8	171	0.22	45	0.1%
Oregon	130	455	25	0.9	138	0.19	30	0.1%
Pennsylvania	350	1,225	31	1.1	165	0.09	13	0.0%
South Carolina	340	1,190	21	0.7	190	0.15	38	0.1%
Texas	640	2,240	69	2.5	476	0.08	15	0.1%
Vermont	130	455	4	0.1	28	0.18	41	0.2%
Virginia	285	998	17	0.6	159	0.07	17	0.1%
Washington	280	980	54	1.9	297	0.24	36	0.2%
Wisconsin	350	1,225	83	3.0	480	0.49	80	0.2%
Total U.S.	8,485	\$89,368	\$2,436	87.0	20,628	0.24	58	0.4%
Canada	150	525	14	0.5	79			
Grand Total	8,635	\$89,893	\$2,450	87.5	20,707			

each year, which translates to a 4,200-ton reduction in CO₂ emissions.¹²³ The value of the fuel saved easily outweighed the initial cost, so signal coordination is far more cost-effective than passenger rail transportation.

A step states can take is to pay for all new highway capacity using electronic tolling systems in which the tolls vary by the amount of congestion. Most vehicles on the road during rush hour are not carrying commuters, and variable tolls can significantly

reduce congestion by encouraging people to shift their travel to less congested times of the day.

An even bigger step is to accelerate the development of intelligent transportation systems. Intelligent highways and intelligent cars can significantly reduce congestion, as well as greatly improve transportation safety, without building a lot of new capacity.¹²⁴

Even individuals can help reduce congestion when they buy new cars. Many new cars are equipped with adaptive cruise control, in which the car senses the distance to the vehicle in front and automatically adjusts speeds to maintain safety. Since computer reflexes are faster than humans, traffic researchers estimate that congestion will significantly decline when as few as 20 percent of drivers on the road use adaptive cruise control.¹²⁵ State governments that truly want to save energy, instead of just trying to change people's behavior, could offer tax incentives to people who buy cars equipped with such technologies.

CONCLUSIONS

High-speed rail is a technology whose time has come and gone. What might have been useful a century ago is today merely an anachronism that will cost taxpayers tens or hundreds of billions of dollars yet contribute little to American mobility or environmental quality.

The most ardent supporters of high-speed rail predict that the FRA plan will carry the average American less than 60

miles per year, and average Ohio residents even less than that. By comparison, the average American travels by automobile more than 15,000 miles per year. The environmental benefits of high-speed rail are similarly miniscule, and when added to the environmental costs of building high-speed rail lines are probably negative.

Given such tiny benefits, the real impetus behind high-speed rail is the desire to change Americans' lifestyles: increasing the share of families living in multi-family housing while discouraging new single-family homes, and increasing the share of travel taking transit and intercity rail while discouraging driving. Such behavioral efforts will be costly and produce few environmental or social benefits.

Based on these findings, Ohio should apply for its share of the \$8 billion in stimulus money solely for incremental improvements to existing rail lines, including safer crossing gates and better signaling. It should not plan to purchase new

locomotives and railcars for passenger service that will be both expensive to operate and harmful to the environment. Nor should the Federal Railroad Administration commit the federal government to funding expensive new high-speed lines such as the proposed lines in California or Florida.

The United States can do many things to cost-effectively improve transportation networks in ways that save energy, reduce accidents, and cut toxic and greenhouse gas emissions. High-speed rail is not one of those things.



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*Published in conjunction with the
Texas Public Policy Foundation*

