High-Speed Rail Part 6: The Risks of California HSR
posted in Planning Disasters, Transportation |Yesterday’s post on the costs of California high-speed rail discussed the likelihood that this megaproject will cost more than projected and the likelihood that taxpayers who pay for construction will have to pay again to rebuild the system every thirty or so years. Such costs are not so much a risk as a certainty. But there are many other risks involved with high-speed rail, some of which could unexpectedly drive up construction costs even more, and others affecting operations.
Some of these risks were identified in the senate oversight report on high-speed rail, including right-of-way, safety, and ridership risks. One important rish that was not brought out by the senate report is the risk that competing technologies will render high-speed rail obsolete.
Right-of-way risks: Rail aficionados often fantasize that high-speed rail can be built in the median strips of existing freeways, thus eliminating any problems with buy rights of way. But freeways have steeper grades and sharper turns than are feasible for high-speed rail, and they often don’t have room in the medians in any case.
The California High-Speed Rail Authority actually planned to use a portion of the right-of-way around Interstate 15 near San Diego for its route. But a recent expansion of highway lanes has eliminated that option. Now the Authority is searching for a new route, which will undoubtedly cost more.
The California project relied much more on existing railroad rights of way for its route. Pretty much most of the line from Sacramento to Anaheim would follow either the Union Pacific (former Southern Pacific) or BNSF (former Santa Fe) routes, while the San Francisco-to-San Jose line would follow the state-owned CalTrains (former Southern Pacific) route.
The senate report questioned whether there was room in these rights of way for high-speed rail. As an example, it pointed to a two-track BNSF route between Fullerton and Commerce that now carries 127 trains a day. Due to the number of trains, BNSF is planning to build a third track, which will leave no space for the double-tracked high-speed rail line.
Even if space is available, it is not clear that the railroads will cooperate. In May, 2008, the Union Pacific Railroad told the Authority that it was not interested in sharing its right-of-way with high-speed trains. “Union Pacific has carefully evaluated CHSAs project,” says a letter from the railroad, and “does not feel it is in Union Pacific’s best interest to have any proposed alignment located on Union Pacific rights-of-way. Therefore, as your project moves forward with its final design, it is our request that you do so in such a way as to not require the use of Union Pacific operating rights-of-way or interfere with Union Pacific operations.”
The freight railroads have good reason to be wary of sharing their right-of-way. Earlier this year, CSX was sued for negligence when one of its freight cars crashed into a commuter train near Boston. A simple way for the railroads to avoid such accidents is to keep passenger trains off their properties. Another way, which is what Union Pacific might be seeking, to for the Authority to sign an agreement accepting sole liability for any problems even if they are nominally the railroad’s fault. In any case, until the Authority reaches an agreement with the railroads, California voters cannot count on cost or route projections that use existing railroad rights of way.
Safety: The senate report points out that rail safety standards follow very different philosophies in the U.S. than in Europe and Japan. Europe/Japan relies on accident avoidance through precise engineering of tracks and vehicle wheelsets. The U.S. relies on accident survivability through careful design of rail cars. In practice, this means that U.S. rail cars are much heavier than those in Europe/Japan.
Obviously, lighter weight vehicles are less expensive to build and require less energy to move. The Authority assumed it would use such vehicles in its 220-mph trains. This allowed it to project, for example, that despite the high speeds its trains would use less than half as much energy, per passenger mile, than Amtrak’s trains.

For the most part, the European/Japanese philosophy has worked very well as there have been few fatal high-speed rail accidents. But the above photos illustrate the differences in safety standards. The photo above is of a high-speed rail accident, caused by a faulty wheel, in Germany. Several of the cars were smashed to pieces and more than 100 people were killed.

This photo is of the 2005 commuter-rail accident in Glendale, California. Most of the railcars in this accident are intact and only 11 people were killed. Granted that the Glendale train was not going as fast as the German train, the U.S. rail cars were still more survivable.

Last week’s Chatsworth collision, in which one commuter car “telescoped” into the locomotive and killed at least 25 people, is exactly the kind of accident U.S. safety standards are designed to prevent (and makes me wonder if those double-decker commuter cars are properly designed). Except for the first car, all of the cars on the train were intact. If lightweight European cars had been involved in the accident, it is likely that many more would have been killed. (All accident photos are from Wikipedia.)
The problem for California high-speed rail comes with the Authority’s plans to operate its trains in the same rights-of-way as conventional U.S. trains, as shown in the animation above. The derailment of a conventional train could cause severe damage to a high-speed train. The Federal Railroad Administration, which regulates rail safety standards, might not object to lightweight trains themselves, but might object to operating them adjacent to conventional trains. If so, then the Authority will have to find alternate rights of way even if the railroads were willing to let it use their routes.
Ridership: The California high-speed rail EIS projects (on page 3.2-26) that rail will carry between 32 and 58 million people in 2020. Are these numbers realistic? The Reason Foundation suggests we compare them with Amtrak’s Boston-to-Washington (Northeast Corridor) trains.
The Census Bureau estimated that about 41.0 million people lived in the metropolitan areas of the Northeast Corridor in 2006. By comparison, only 32.5 million people lived in metro areas on California’s high-speed rail corridor. At current rates of population growth (about 1 percent per year in California), this will reach 37.5 million by 2020, or roughly 92 percent of the Northeast Corridor today.
Amtrak reports (on page A-3.3, physical page 21) that, in fiscal year 2007, it carried a record number of passengers: 10.0 million in the Northeast Corridor, just 3.2 million of which rode its high-speed Acela trains. Of course, California’s trains are supposed to go faster, but will that speed be enough to attract ten times as many passengers as Amtrak’s high-speed train or more than three times as many passengers as use the entire Northeast Corridor?
Complicating the question is the fact that, while the California and Northeast corridors are both about the same length, their populations are distributed quite differently. The Northeast Corridor has tens of millions of people living in intermediate metro areas: Providence, Bridgeport, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore. California’s corridor has most people living near the end points of the corridor. This means California’s trains will attract fewer intermediate riders, who make up the vast majority of Northeast Corridor ridership.
If actual California ridership falls short of projections, then all of the benefits claimed for the project will be overstated. In particular, the revenues that the Authority is counting on to repay the private partner’s share of the costs will not be there. Since the Authority wants to build its network in stages — San Francisco to LA first, with extensions to San Diego, Anaheim, and Sacramento later — a revenue shortfall will make it even more costly for California taxpayers to complete those extensions.
Competing technologies: One of the examples of optimism bias in the California rail plans is a presumption that there will be virtually no improvements in competing technologies — highways, autos, buses, and air — over the live of the high-speed rail network. Autos are expected to travel just as slowly (if not slower due to increased congestion), airport security will continue to delay air travelers, and both autos and airplanes will continue to use just as much energy as they do today.
As I will discuss tomorrow, the energy assumption is certainly wrong. But the other assumptions can easily be wrong as well. There are many improvements in both technology and systems management on the horizon that will keep high-speed rail from being the grand success its planners claim.
Computer-controlled autos: UC Berkeley has developed a bus that steers itself. On city streets, the bus still needs a driver to start and stop, but on freeways any vehicles using this low-cost technology could safely travel at high speeds, thus greatly increasing the capacities of existing highways.
If you can take your own car from, say, Sacramento to Bakersfield or San Francisco to Fresno on an uncongested highway at 90 miles per hour — and let the car do the driving most of the way, freeing you to read or work — then high-speed rail loses most of its advantage. Sure, the train goes faster, but first you have to get to the train station, wait until the train is scheduled to leave, then when you arrive you are dependent on local transport instead of enjoying the convenience of your own car.
Streamlined airport security: Even at 220 mph, high-speed rail can’t compete with 400-mph turboprops, much less 500-mph regional jets. The Authority’s plans count on airport security delays forcing people to arrive at airports an hour or two in advance of their plane’s departure. But if security is streamlined — perhaps by vetting frequent flyers in advance so they can by-pass airport checkpoints — high-speed rail loses this advantage. Since (according to page 19 of the senate report) the Authority is counting on business travelers for 91 percent of its profits, losing frequent travelers means losing the whole ball game.
End of hub-and-spoke travel: Most airlines today have two things in common: they rely on hub-and-spoke systems and they lose money. The airlines that make money, like Southwest and Jet Blue, are not using hub-and-spoke systems. But people flying from, say, Oakland to Bakersfield or San Diego to Fresno are forced to use the hub-and-spoke system, usually meaning layovers in LAX or SFO. A regional airline that breaks the hub-and-spoke model, flying more planes direct to more California destinations, will offer greater competition to high-speed rail.
Continuing decentralization: To boast rail’s advantage over flying, the Authority is fond of comparing downtown-to-downtown travel times by rail vs. air. But this assumes everybody wants to begin and end their trips downtown. In reality, downtown Los Angeles has only 2.5 percent of the region’s jobs (see page 12), and the downtowns of San Francisco, Oakland, and San Jose together only have about 12 percent of Bay Area jobs. Job decentralization is likely to continue, making high-speed rail attractive to fewer and fewer travelers.
Improved bus service: So-called Chinatown buses are offering increased competition to Amtrak’s Northeast corridor. Aided by Internet ticket sales, these buses offer very low-cost travel and often provide city-to-suburb or suburb-to-suburb service (thus going people actually live). Even confined to highway speeds, they can be competitive because different buses serve different city pairs, thus avoiding the delays of intermediate stops. Such buses can provide transport to today’s decentralized cities in ways that fixed rail cannot.
These are just a few of the ways that changes in technology and other systems can be foreseen to make high-speed rail a risky investment. No doubt there are many unforeseeable changes as well. California voters who support high-speed rail are betting that none of these changes will take place.




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