Boston Transit System Near Collapse
posted in News commentary, Transportation |“The Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority [MBTA] is in danger of collapsing under its own operating expenses and debt obligations, to the point that it can’t even pay for repairs that are vital to basic safety,” reports the Boston Globe. That conclusion is based on an official review of the MBTA that Governor Deval Patrick entrusted to former John Hancock CEO David D’Alessandro.

Up through the 1990s, the MBTA was funded by the state, with the agency effectively presenting a bill for its deficits to the legislature each year. Concerned that this failed to give transit officials incentives to control costs, the legislature in 1999 decided to give MBTA a fixed 20 percent share of state sales tax revenues and told it to operate out of those revenues. This was supposed to lead to reduced operating costs and greater investments in the long-term health of the system.
As the D’Alessandro report documents, this isn’t what happened. First, most costs, such as fuel, were outside of MBTA’s control. Even costs that were under MBTA’s control, such as payroll, ended up increasing far faster than planned. Meanwhile, the sales taxes that were supposed to fund MBTA’s deficits fell short of expectations. The result, over an eight-year period, was a $558 million shortfall.
MBTA dealt with this shortfall by restructuring its debt, allowing it to defer payments. But this only deferred the pain, as deferral led the debt to grow not by $558 million but $2.9 billion.
Meanwhile, MBTA also deferred maintenance (which transit agencies consider “capital improvements”) such as replacement of worn-out track, vehicles, and other facilities. In 2004, the agency estimated that it had a $2.7 billion backlog of projects needed to restore the system to a “state of good repair” (SGR); by 2009 this had grown to $3.2 billion.
D’Alessandro was particularly upset about safety issues. He found that, among the hundreds of projects that the agency had identified for its 2010 budget as needed to bring the system into a state of good repair, 57 were rated as posing an “imminent danger to life or limb of passengers and/or employees.” Yet only six of these projects were funded.
Predictably, Massachusetts has responded by rearranging the deck chairs, creating a transportation superagency to manage the MBTA along with all of the state’s other transportation programs. This does nothing to solve the agency’s overall problems.
The MBTA’s former executive director, who was forced out of his job as a part of the agency restructuring, offers his own comments on the D’Alessandro report. Some of his thoughts are good, but many seem aimed at absolving himself from any guilt regarding the agency’s problems.
The governor did not ask D’Alessandro for specific recommendations, but he did offer a few general ones. One that the Antiplanner likes is that MBTA should “Slow expansion until the safety and maintenance priorities can be addressed.” In other words, fix it first. As D’Alessandro says, “It makes little sense to continue expanding the system when the MBTA cannot maintain the existing one.”
D’Alessandro’s other suggestions leave something to be desired. His top recommendation is to “prioritize safety issues,” in other words, to fund safety projects before anything else. While this sounds good, the only result will be that local managers will give every project a top safety rating, and so some other criteria will have to be used to choose among them.
Another recommendation is to develop “new revenue sources.” While this sounds like a no-brainer, the reality is that, if you give a transit agency more tax revenue, it will simply expand its deficits — by, for example, building new rail lines or granting bigger pensions to employees — to absorb that revenue.
One of the few positive notes reported by D’Alessandro is that fare revenues between 2001 and 2008 were $95 million more than expected. Yet D’Alessandro warns that transit riders should not be asked to pay higher fares until the MBTA has managed to provide them with better and safer service. That sounds reasonable, but maybe the whole problem is that transit riders haven’t been asked to pay the real cost of transportation in the first place.
In 2008, MBTA fares covered 43 percent of its operating costs but only 31 percent of its operating and capital costs. (You can find these numbers in the 2008 National Transit Database file that I recently posted.) If you add the amount D’Alessandro says the MBTA should have spent to keep and restore the system in good repair, fares covered less than a quarter of the total.
Boston has one of the most heavily used transit systems in the nation, yet it carries only about 13 percent of the region’s commuters to work and only about 3 percent of all motorized passenger travel in the Boston urban area. Why do we think a system like this deserves annual subsidies of more than $1.5 billion a year?
Massachusetts’ mistake a decade ago was thinking that providing MBTA with a dedicated tax instead of annual appropriations would give it an incentive to fix its problems. It didn’t, partly because many of its problems are out of its control and partly because it probably realized the state would come to its rescue anyway (which it has by giving MBTA $160 million on top of its dedicated sales tax).
The Antiplanner contents that transportation systems funded out of user fees provide better incentives and checks and balances than ones funded out of taxes. User fees would tell the agency how much people are willing to pay for transit, and it would provide the kind of transit that it could pay for out of such fees.
The fact that MBTA is so heavily in debt and can’t keep its system in a state of good repair should signal something more than, “transit needs more money.” It should tell people that MBTA’s transit model, which is largely based on funding expensive and inflexible rail systems out of tax dollars, is fundamentally unsound.




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