Most DC visitors and residents consider the Washington Metrorail system to be a great success. Among them is Zachary Schrag, author of The Great Society Subway: A History of the Washington Metro. But, as Schrag clearly documents, by the standards of Metrorail’s original planners, it is a dismal failure.
Back in 1962, planners projected that a 103-mile rail system would cost less than $800 million — or about $4.6 billion in 2009 dollars. Moreover, they expected that fares would cover all of the operating costs and nearly 80 percent of the capital costs (pp. 53-54).
As it turned out, the actual 103-mile system that was completed in 2001 covers all of the basic routes of that original plan, yet cost $17.6 billion in 2009 dollars, close to four times the initial projection. Fares cover only about 60 percent of operating costs and, of course, none of the capital costs.
(I calculated the capital cost using the FTA’s 2000 statement that costs up to that date were $8.8 billion in nominal dollars. To adjust that for inflation, I presumed this money was spent, on average, in 1988, the approximate midpoint of the period between 1975 — a year before the system opened — and 2001. Actually, a lot of money was spent before 1975, so this is conservative. I then added the inflation-adjusted costs of the remaining 13 miles that were opened in 2001 as estimated in the same FTA report.)
Until 1974, when construction was well underway, planners continued to claim that the system would pay all its operating costs and at least some of its capital costs. Only when the first lines were about to open did they start talking about rail as a “quality of life” issue rather than an economic issue (p. 179).
“We didn’t lie,” one planner explained of the cost overruns. “We just used the most optimistic of forecasts” (p. 172). Danish planner Bent Flyvbjerg considers this practice, which he call optimism bias, to be a form of lying. Whatever you call it, rail planners do the same thing today, but they rarely admit it later.
Cost overruns don’t explain why fares failed to cover the operating costs, as planners projected. Blame this on planners’ optimistic ridership estimates. They projected that the Metrorail system would lure more than one-third of the region’s commuters and three-fifths of peak-hour trips downtown to use transit (pp. 184, 277). In fact, it achieved less than half these numbers.
“I have no apologies to make for overestimating ridership and revenue,” said one planner later. “It was in the public interest” (p. 281). Hmmm. Schrag doesn’t see any irony in the fact that the planners who claim to be able use our resources wisely have no problem with lying in order to persuade people to spend more than planners predict on projects that will achieve less than planners claim.
The interesting thing is that planners in the 1960s felt it was important to claim that rail transit would cover its operating costs and at least some of its capital costs. Since at least the early 1980s, planners of new rail systems don’t even bother to pretend that fares will come close to covering costs. They take it for granted that people will agree that it is “in the public interest” to lose tons of money and sniff derisively when the Antiplanner’s faithful allies criticize these losses. It would be interesting to trace the history of this transition.
Its occurrence can take place without counting the age, which means not just elderly or middle men are prone to it but it has taken its toll over both men viagra sildenafil 100mg and women. Another most dangerous thing cialis 40mg 60mg is that using ED medicines when you are not having sex. If the pains are acute enough, a levitra store person may be affected by an underlying illness or medical condition equivalent to endocrine problems, diabetes, Kallmann’s syndrome, hypogonadism, hyperprolactinemia, drug and alcohol-related problems, that harms the creation of cGMP, the material that can enhance the blood circulation. This is why we have decided to highlight some cost levitra low https://regencygrandenursing.com/about-us/regency-faq-s of the necessary precautions you need to take before using the medication, as it is quickly absorbed into the bloodstream and starts working quicker than other medications.
Throughout most of the book, Schrag presents the issue as roads vs. rail: if DC had not built Metrorail, it would have had to destroy all kinds of neighborhoods with new freeways. He barely mentions that there was a third alternative “proposed by the National Capital Parks and Planning Commission in 1950”: to simply let the region become more decentralized so that the downtown area wouldn’t need either roads or rail (pp. 19-20, 279). The plan called for three beltways and more than two dozen edge cities surrounding DC. Schrag notes that, in the mid-1970s, DC’s downtown “became dominated by the sex industry,” and suggests this would have been its permanent fate under the decentralization option.
Yet, even though only one of the beltways was built, decentralization is really what happened. Metrorail’s average track-mile carries only about half as many passenger miles as a single freeway lane mile, so the six double-track rail lines that converge on downtown are about equal to one six-lane freeway. The highway that rail advocates rejected included several such freeways, and Metrorail failed to substitute for these unbuilt roads. Without adequate transportation, most new jobs moved to the suburbs. (Fortunately for cyclists like the Antiplanner, downtown DC is not very congested; the congestion is all on the routes approaching downtown.)
Between 1990 and 2000, the DC urbanized area gained 133,000 jobs. The number of commuters taking Metrorail to work grew by just under 21,000, but the number taking the bus to work fell by 45,000 for a net loss to transit of more than 21,000. Meanwhile, nearly 165,000 new single-occupancy vehicles were on the road. The reason transit lost so many commuters is that most of the new jobs were in the suburbs.
Nor is Metrorail responsible for downtown DC’s recovery. Downtowns all over the country went through a disreputable phase in the 1970s, and except for Detroit almost all of them recovered, rail or no rail. Times Square was dominated by the “sex industry” for a time, and it already had a subway. Downtowns in cities like Austin, Indianapolis, Milwaukee, and San Antonio are thriving entertainment centers today even though those cities lack rail. Schrag shows that downtown Washington’s recovery was aided (and in some cases delayed) by various urban renewal funds, though he stops short of asking how much money was spent on top of the cost of Metrorail.
Ballston. View Larger Map
There is no doubt that Metrorail has helped shape the DC area, but its influence is much smaller than rail advocates claim. As Schrag points out, Tysons Corner (which is on Interstate 495) grew like wildfire even without a rail connection (pp. 233-242), while the area around the Silver Spring Metro station (two miles from the nearest interstate) was zoned for high-density development and almost nothing happened (p. 231). Local residents successfully prevented dense rezoning of areas around other stations such as Takoma Park (p. 227).
Like other rail advocates, Schrag points to Ballston as an example of a transit-oriented development spurred by Metro (pp. 221-230). What Schrag and other rail enthusiasts never admit is that Interstate 66, with an exit at Ballston, opened in 1982, shortly before the Metrorail, and that has as much to do with the community’s development as the rail line. Silver Spring has no nearby freeway, which is why it hasn’t developed.
Tysons Corner. View Larger Map
Schrag pans Tysons for being a pedestrian-unfriendly “mess” (p. 237) while he praises Ballston for its pedestrian-friendly design (p. 232). What he fails to note (but as discussed here) is that Tysons’ developers wanted to build a denser development, but local planners wouldn’t let them because of traffic concerns. The developers then lobbied for a rail connection in the hope that this would lead planners to give them permission for more density — but planners still refused, saying the rail line wouldn’t do enough to relieve congestion.
The Antiplanner estimates that Metrorail fares would have to be nearly 5 times the current rates to cover operating costs and amortized capital costs. I make use of this subsidy whenever I am in DC, but I remain convinced that there was a more efficient solution to DC’s transportation issues.
The Antiplanner wrote:
> Most DC visitors and residents consider the Washington
> Metrorail system to be a great success. Among them is
> Zachary Schrag, author of The Great Society Subway:
> A History of the Washington Metro. But, as Schrag
> clearly documents, by the standards of Metrorail’s
> original planners, it is a dismal failure.
In spite of the Antiplanner’s comments above, I commend Schrag’s book to readers of this blog. It is an informative and fun read, even for rail skeptics.
> Back in 1962, planners projected that a 103-mile rail
> system would cost less than $800 million — or about
> $4.6 billion in 2009 dollars. Moreover, they expected that
> fares would cover all of the operating costs and
> nearly 80 percent of the capital costs (pp. 53-54).
Maybe more to the point, at the time that ground was broken for Metrorail in 1969, the advertised price was about $2.55 billion to complete the so-called Adopted Regional System.
> The interesting thing is that planners in the 1960s felt
> it was important to claim that rail transit would cover
> its operating costs and at least some of its capital
> costs. Since at least the early 1980s, planners of new
> rail systems don’t even bother to pretend that fares
> will come close to covering costs. They take it for
> granted that people will agree that it is “in the
> public interest†to lose tons of money and sniff
> derisively when the Antiplanner’s faithful allies
> criticize these losses. It would be interesting to
> trace the history of this transition.
Not just cover the operating costs, in the early 1970’s (when the first sections of the rail system were under construction) WMATA advertised that Metrorail would actually earn a “profit” for its local government members once it was completed.
> Throughout most of the book, Schrag presents the issue
> as roads vs. rail: if DC had not built Metrorail, it would
> have had to destroy all kinds of neighborhoods with
> new freeways.
This argument has been used, over and over again, by opponents of new highways and highway improvements in Washington and its suburbs, to justify their opposition, most recently in the case of Maryland’s InterCounty Connector toll road (now under construction after about 50 years of opposition).
> Nor is Metrorail responsible for downtown DC’s recovery.
> Downtowns all over the country went through a disreputable
> phase in the 1970s, and except for Detroit almost all of
> them recovered, rail or no rail. Times Square was dominated
> by the “sex industry†for a time, and it already had a subway.
I am not so certain about this. Persons I respect (and those persons are independent of WMATA (Metro) and the unions that represent its employees) have said that the rail system did help to “save” downtown D.C. My own opinion is that downtown D.C. would have done well without Metrorail, mostly because it is still the seat of the United States Government, and as such, will always have a decent (even though it may not grow that much) stock of jobs in and near the Monumental Core.
Though O’Toole’s bias favors roads, so of course he’s going to be hostile to rail.
Roads & railroads can co exist fine, but like those on Faux News you’d rather destroy than build.
Zachary Schrag has a decent online exhibit that relates to planning for (and design of) the Washington Metrorail system here.
“Downtowns in cities like Austin, Indianapolis, Milwaukee, and San Antonio are thriving entertainment centers today even though those cities lack rail.”
I’ll only speak to the two TX cities mentioned. Yes, no rail, but aggressive “New Urbanist,” style planning can claim much responsibility for this. Just saying.
Also, TX is one of the worse states in the country when it comes to drinking and driving. Could it be, that there is no viable alternative to get anywhere in this state (including the bar) without a personal auto? Just asking.
“I make use of this subsidy whenever I am in DC…”
Where is ole’ ettinger? I’d love to get into one of those walk the walk arguments right now.
@Bennett, arguing for transit because of DUIs isn’t exactly a great tack to take. One can go to a dinner party and have dinner and a couple drinks in a couple hours without any problems. More so driving doesn’t cause people to drink heavily, either. More so, states like Texas sometimes have higher rates of DUIs than others… sometimes lower. IIRC, just a couple years ago the worst state for rate of deaths while driving under the influence was Alaska for DUIs. Is it because one needs to drive everywhere? Maybe that’s some influence. But, and again this is off the top of my head, that same year Rhode Island and Connecticut had worse rates than Alaska. And DC wasn’t very far behind (in fact, I believe it beat out some states like Montana and Texas that year).
Feeling compelled to drive may indeed be a small factor. But I suspect there’s a lot more too it than just that.
Prk,
Good answer. Your a Colorado guy, right? Where does CO fair in the DUI stats? Last I heard it had the highest amount of illicit drug use (and I assume alcohol is up there too) per capita. If they are not towards the top of the list for DUI’s, I wonder what factors contribute to that, since we know that people are imbibing at a high rate.
the Railwayman:
Roads & railroads can co exist fine, but like those on Faux News you’d rather destroy than build.
That reminds me: I destroyed another 13 miles of rail over the weekend, furthering my efforts from the 4 miles of rail I hid under some dirt the weekend before. There were people waiting to use the tracks and a train idling right there, but I pulled up the bolts and threw the steel into a nearby ravine. A fat white guy from Big Oil delivered my blood money shortly afterward in a briefcase forged of bone fragments from endangered animal skulls.
Accordingly, please update your crackpot statistics to reflect that there are 100,017 miles of rail missing in the United States. After all, if you’re going to continue to be the internet equivalent of a nutcase shouting conspiracy theories from a street corner, please remember that precision counts.
Pingback: How Much Has New Rail Transit Cost? » The Antiplanner
Mike said: That reminds me: I destroyed another 13 miles of rail over the weekend, furthering my efforts from the 4 miles of rail I hid under some dirt the weekend before. There were people waiting to use the tracks and a train idling right there, but I pulled up the bolts and threw the steel into a nearby ravine. A fat white guy from Big Oil delivered my blood money shortly afterward in a briefcase forged of bone fragments from endangered animal skulls.
Accordingly, please update your crackpot statistics to reflect that there are 100,017 miles of rail missing in the United States. After all, if you’re going to continue to be the internet equivalent of a nutcase shouting conspiracy theories from a street corner, please remember that precision counts.
THWM: Sorry Mike, I don’t love the government as much as you do.
Pingback: The Cable-Car Test » The Antiplanner
“Accordingly, please update your crackpot statistics to reflect that there are 100,017 miles of rail missing in the United States. After all, if you’re going to continue to be the internet equivalent of a nutcase shouting conspiracy theories from a street corner, please remember that precision counts.” – Highwayman
They’re no more crackpot than claiming there is over 100+k “missing” based on some peak milage and implying that none of the “loss” is due to gains in effency, unstainable overbuilding (yes, there were bubbles in this country before 1999) and other reasons. The situation is far more complex than you imply. So if you’re going to call people out for precision, share with us a detailed breakdown of how you get to that 100+k.
prk166:
The 100,000 statistic isn’t mine. It’s Highwayman’s. It’s one of his occasional recurring bits of incoherent wharrgarble, though it’s been a few weeks since he used that particular nugget. My post is making fun of his rants, both in the past and in posts such as the one you see two entries above yours. I figured the “endangered animal skulls” bit would make my approach obvious to everyone except THWM himself.
I would say it’s up to Highwayman to explain where his statistic of the missing 100+k miles of rail comes from. Just don’t count on his answer to make any sense whatsoever.
I’m just saying it, as it is.
You teabagging libertards bitch & whine about government mean while in benefit from it vastly.
So shut fuck up!
Highwayman:
So shut fuck up!
Sir, that hilariously incoherent rejoinder pretty much sums up everything any reader needs to know about you. Bravo!
It takes a certain bravado to attack DC Metrorail, especially by using numbers. The DC metro is an amazing success, and the numbers clearly show this. I have this book on my shelf, and Mr. O’Toole seems to be taking information out of context and distorting numbers at will.
Let’s take the issue of capacity first.
Metrorail carries about 800,000 trips per day. This map attempts to graph where those passengers are during the morning period:
http://tracktwentynine.blogspot.com/2009/11/metro-ridership-patterns-expanded.html
As can be seen, each of the DC metro lines is carrying something like 30,000 trips during the morning period. Much of that will occur within a two hour period around the rush hour.
In contrast, a typical highway lane can carry about 2,000 cars per hour, or about 3,000 people per hour at best. So a six lane highway can only hope to move 18,000 people per hour under the most ideal circumstances. It is pretty clear that each metro line is pretty near or exceeding the passenger volume of six highway lanes, so the DC metro is worth something like five or six major expressways through town! And, um, where would those hundreds of thousands of riders park if they were driving instead of on the train?
Mr. O’Toole is correct that Metrorail enabled staggering growth in central DC employment, but this had been forecasted from the period of World War II onwards. This centralization was the result of inexorable forces — namely, the desire for a compact and efficient seat of government for a nation exploding in population, economic output, and military power. It happened during Republican and Democratic administrations, because it had nothing whatsoever to do with politics. And it certainly wasn’t due to socialistic planning, given that it took place during the height of the Cold War.
Clustered federal growth was logical. Much of this growth happened long before widespread internet use and personal computers — face to face transactions were especially critical during that period. Ironically, while it is often assumed that telecommunications will tend to encourage decentralization, the opposite may be occurring since many people can now use mobile internet devices while using transit — it turns out that a transit lifestyle complements the digital lifestyle and vice versa. La plus ca change… Likewise, there are clear advantages to being an employer located in the core of the rail system. Access to workforce is optimized.
To argue that decentralization was an answer to growth is silly and circular logic. Mr. O’Toole argues that the region is sprawling, but then doesn’t mention that Beltway traffic is legendary, which is, of course, a direct result of sprawl. Actually, the regional traffic congestion is one reason that the core is growing rapidly. Lots of people, it turns out, prefer the benefits of the dense core with its more livable travel options over the inefficiencies of traveling long distances through the region on congested highways.
Turning to the cost estimates and operating subsidies — the Metro was conceived to be just a rail system primarily built for commuters, but it now also provides local bus service and functions as an urban subway (to a degree). Metrorail was not originally intended to be an integrated agency with local transit. The tide of history, however, has moved transit firmly into the “public service” column, and Metro was quite powerless to prevent this from happening. The agency had to take over the bus system because the private company was going under. This saddled Metro with an entire tier of costs and issues that were not endemic to the rail project. It is possible to imagine a “commercially profitable” subway system — but it would be far less useful to the region because the goal of a commercial enterprise is to maximize profit, not to maximize the public benefit.
And they aren’t done building. Track is currently under construction to Dulles International Airport, via Tysons Corner. And that is surely not going to be the end of Metro expansion. Turns out that the region not only needs Metro — it also likes Metro. As Mr. O’Toole is honest enough to admit, he uses it every time he is in DC…
Pingback: A Light-Rail Line That Pays for Itself? » The Antiplanner