The Washington legislature refused to fund the state’s share of a proposed bridge across the Columbia River, proving that at least a few Pacific Northwest politicians still have an ounce of common sense. That doesn’t include the Oregon legislature, which had agreed to put up more than $400 million for the project.
As a result of the Washington legislature’s decision, the Columbia River Crossing office is closing its doors after having spent something like $200 million on a stupid plan for a new bridge that wasn’t going to be tall enough for existing river traffic and whose main goal was to send a low-capacity rail transit line from Portland to Vancouver, Washington.
The two bridges that the new bridge was supposed to replace don’t really need replacement. While one was built in 1913 (and the other in 1958). the older of the two could probably have been replaced for about half a billion dollars if it were really necessary. But the proposed new bridge and associated projects were projected to cost $3.4 billion.
Ironically, critics of the new bridge have entirely different reasons for their opposition. Some believed the main goal of the bridge was to bring low-capacity rail transit into Vancouver. But someone named Joe Cortright called the bridge “the last gasp of the highway-building dinosaur.” There is probably some truth to both views.
Thus even if you do feel like stopping, chances are high that such addiction can effects of viagra occur yet again. Both these drugs contain sildenafil citrate, which quickly improves blood flow resulting in an enlarged penis ready for the direct physical intercourse. viagra canadian valsonindia.com Often, these children blame their parents order generic cialis for not helping them; this distrust of relationships carries onto adulthood. Psychogenic impotence: More and more professionals are talking purchase cialis online http://valsonindia.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Reg.13-3.Valson-Dec15.pdf about so-called. As the Antiplanner noted in a review of the proposal, the freeway leading to the bridge in both directions only has six lanes, yet planners wanted a twelve-lane bridge. Two of the lanes were for on- and off-ramps at either end of the bridge, but that still left four more lanes than would be supported by the highway. While the bridge is congested, most of that congestion could be relieved by variable tolls.
The real problem was that the bridge was planned by a consortium of eight different government agencies, and they all agreed that they needed 100 percent consensus for their plans to work. So every member of the consortium could hold out for whatever they wanted, whether it was low-capacity rail, twelve lands, or to rebuild every interchange for several miles both north and south of the bridge itself.
If there is any lesson to be learned from this expensive debacle, it is that this is the wrong way to plan transportation projects. It is bad enough that, as an interstate bridge, the project requires the cooperation of the two state highway agencies. Throwing in two transit agencies, two cities, and two metropolitan planning organizations makes the project unnecessarily complicated, especially considering that none of these entities really has any authority over the bridge.
Unfortunately, the lack of common sense that led to this folly still prevails in the Pacific Northwest. Previous reports of the death of this boondoggle have been exaggerated, and since Washington’s governor supports the project, he may twist a few legislators’ arms to revive it.
If the Columbia River Crossing isn’t given a last-minute reprieve, it is likely that something just as idiotic will emerge from its ashes. For one thing, the Federal Transit Administration had actually recommended (see p. 4) $850 million in funding that would have paid for most of the low-capacity rail line, and state and local politicians aren’t going to want to lose that money.
From reading about this project over the years, it has been my understanding that :
(1) It adds no highway capacity to the crossing (even though the bridge is wider, the freeway approaches are not);
(2) Proposes to impose tolls on highway users; and
(3) Extends Tri-Met’s MAX light rail system into the state of Washington for the first time (allowing Tri-Met new places to go exploring for tax subsidies, in addition to the diverted toll revenues that Tri-Met boosters no doubt feel Tri-Met is “entitiled” to).
The metropolitan Washington, D.C. area had a similar problem with the old and very inadequate six lane Woodrow Wilson Bridge (Capital Beltway and I-95 crossing the Potomac River). It was only one metropolitan planning organization involved, but two states, the federal District of Columbia – plus two counties, one independent city, the regional transit authority and an assortment of federal agencies, starting with the National Park Service.
Project planning started in the 1990’s. After about 10 years of planning and preliminary engineering, a lawsuit in opposition by the Sierra Club (Sierra won in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, but that victory was reversed by the U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit), and over 12 years of construction, the project is finally complete. The approaches and the bridge itself have been widened to a “local/express” 10 lanes, and there is one unused lane each way reserved for [as the Antiplanner calls it] low-capacity rail or HOV or HOV/Toll lanes.
The Woodrwo Wilson bridge probably carries more traffic every day than the proposed Columbia Bridge would in a month. I am probably being generous to the Columbia bridge.
C. P. Zilliacus said “From reading about this project over the years, it has been my understanding that : (1) It adds no highway capacity to the crossing (even though the bridge is wider, the freeway approaches are not); …”
The new bridge itself would have had 5 lanes in each direction (designated as 3 thru and 2 auxiliary), compared to 3 currently, but the project would have also added several miles of freeway improvements both north and south of the bridge which would have added significant capacity and helped reduce congestion. This would have been done mainly by adding separate collector/distributor lanes and by reconfiguring on- and off-ramps to eliminate weaving movements, which cause congestion. The freeway improvements were so substantial that they would have cost more than the bridge.
I’m convinced that the bridge does need replacement, and new capacity added along the corridor. Whether or not Cortright is right about future traffic increases, the fact is that even with today’s recession-reduced traffic volumes, the bridge suffers hours of daily congestion, and frequently backs up even on weekends and at off-peak times. The bridge itself creates congestion, due to narrow lanes, a lack of shoulders, an undulating surface, and massive superstructure. It suffers a high accident rate, and there’s no place for disabled vehicles to move out of the traffic lane.
The need for additional corridor capacity is due to very high volumes of traffic entering and exiting the freeway just north and south of the bridge. According to 2011 ODOT data, 71,000 vehicles use I-5 northbound daily where I-5 and I-405 merge near downtown Portland. By the time I-5 has gotten past the exits for Delta Park and Marine Drive (just south of the bridge), volume has dropped below 37,000, but jumps to 62,000 when these two interchanges add 25,000 vehicles to the freeway. I don’t have data for the WA side of the bridge, but expect similar high ramp volumes just north of the bridge exist there too, such as for the SR-14 freeway which connects immediately at the north end of the bridge. This all convinces me that additional capacity on the bridge, and the couple of miles south to Delta Park, and north to at least the SR-14 interchange.
I hope to see an effort to replace the bridge continue, but pared down to keep the cost reasonable. While the C/D roadways and weaved ramps would be helpful, they’re not worth the cost. I’d just replace the bridge and extend the additional lanes to Delta Park on the south and SR-14 (or further) on the north. I think this could probably be done for less than $1.5 billion (the bridge alone is under a billion). As for transit, I’d expand the local WA transit agency’s (C-Tran) excellent express bus service to downtown Portland (currently running from several park-and-ride lots) and add HOV lanes between the bridge and downtown Portland (about 5 miles), which could be done at a fraction of the cost of light rail, and would allow the bus service to have reliable running times (about 3x as fast as light rail would be, incidentally). This could hopefully be done with the approximately 2 billion in funding that the state and federal governments had planned to spend on the project, but without the need for the oppressively high tolls that were planned (about $2,000 a year during commute hours), and which would fall most heavily on the large number of Washingtonians who have to work in Oregon (and who already have to pay Oregon income tax, from which they receive no benefit).
JOHN1000 wrote:
The Woodrwo Wilson bridge probably carries more traffic every day than the proposed Columbia Bridge would in a month. I am probably being generous to the Columbia bridge.
According to published Maryland Department of Transportation/State Highway Administration counts, the 2011 AADT (annual average daily traffic) was 197,460. In 2011, the work on the bridge itself and the Maryland approach roads was complete, but there was a lot of work still taking place on the Virginia side in and around the Exit 176, (Va. 241 Telegraph Road) interchange.
According to data I looked up on the Oregon DOT Web site, the 2011 AADT for I-5 approaching the Columbia River was 123,900. Like the old Wilson Bridge, the span that carries I-5 over the Columbia is a six-lane draw bridge [the new 12-lane Wilson Bridge is also a draw span, but the vertical clearance with the span closed is much higher than the old bridge], so bridge openings are relatively rare with the new bridge.
kens ftw.
Kens wrote:
I hope to see an effort to replace the bridge continue, but pared down to keep the cost reasonable. While the C/D roadways and weaved ramps would be helpful, they’re not worth the cost. I’d just replace the bridge and extend the additional lanes to Delta Park on the south and SR-14 (or further) on the north. I think this could probably be done for less than $1.5 billion (the bridge alone is under a billion). As for transit, I’d expand the local WA transit agency’s (C-Tran) excellent express bus service to downtown Portland (currently running from several park-and-ride lots) and add HOV lanes between the bridge and downtown Portland (about 5 miles), which could be done at a fraction of the cost of light rail, and would allow the bus service to have reliable running times (about 3x as fast as light rail would be, incidentally). This could hopefully be done with the approximately 2 billion in funding that the state and federal governments had planned to spend on the project, but without the need for the oppressively high tolls that were planned (about $2,000 a year during commute hours), and which would fall most heavily on the large number of Washingtonians who have to work in Oregon (and who already have to pay Oregon income tax, from which they receive no benefit).
The problems you describe above are remarkably similar to the Wilson Bridge, even though the “old” bridge (now demolished) was opened to traffic in 1961.
The Wilson Bridge project included the total reconstruction of interchanges at I-295 (Anacostia Freeway) and Md. 210 (Indian Head Highway) on the Maryland side; and at U.S. 1 (South Patrick Street) and Va. 241 (Telegraph Road) on the Virginia side. Additionally, a long section of I-295 had to be reconstructed and relocated as part of the project.
Congestion related to the ramps close to the bridge were a long-standing problem, especially at the I-295 and U.S. 1 interchanges, which caused long delays and was a contributing factor to many wrecks. Operationally, separating through traffic from the local traffic has proven to be a winner thus far.
Cost for the entire project was between $2.4 and $2.5 billion. About $1.5 billion of that was federal funding. Could it have been financed with less tax money? In my opinion, yes, but given that all-electronic toll collection was not considered a viable option when the new crossing was designed in the late 1990’s, there were assumptions that cash toll collection would have been needed, probably on the Maryland side of the Potomac River.
For what it is worth, reworking the on-ramps and off-ramps and lanes are probably very cost-effective parts of a bridge project. NYC and NE area bridges could carry much more if those lanes worked well.
Also for what it is worth, a bridge to nowhere at least opens up new land and many new opportunities, even if there is nothing on the other side now. On the other hand, a substitute bridge is only worth what its marginal improvements offer.