Search Results for: rail projects

Rail Transit Ballot Measures

Rail transit ballot measures lost in Kansas City and San Jose, but won in Seattle, Sonoma-Marin counties, and Los Angeles. From the point of view of sensible transportation policy, the biggest disaster of the election was passage of the California high-speed rail measure.

Sometimes I think it is wonderful that we can live in a country that is so wealthy that we can afford to build rail lines that cost five times as much per mile as freeway lanes yet carry only one-fifth as many people. But, as it turns out, we really can’t afford to do so.

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A Rail Vision for America’s Future

Suppose Barack Obama is elected president and appoints someone like Portland Congressman Earl Blumenauer as Secretary of Transportation. Suppose further that California votes for high-speed rail. Then, even if some of the rail transit measures on the ballots in Kansas City, San Jose, Seattle, and Sonoma-Marin counties (have I missed any?) don’t pass, it is pretty clear there will be a strong push to build far more passenger rail in America.

How much rail is enough? How much will it cost? What good will it do? Let’s try to envision a rail future for America.

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High-Speed Rail Part 9: Conclusions

The Antiplanner is an unabashed rail nut. My office walls are filled with pictures of trains and rail memorabilia. I’ve traveled at least a quarter of a million miles on Amtrak and Canada’s VIA. When I’ve visited Europe, Australia, and New Zealand, my preferred method of local travel has always been by train. I helped restore the nation’s second-most powerful operating steam locomotive, and my living room has the beginnings of a model railroad.

There is no doubt that, if high-speed rail worked, I would be the first to support it. But my definition of “works” is somewhat different from that of rail advocates, one of whom once told me that he considered a rail transit project successful if it allowed just one person to get to work a little faster — no matter how much it cost everyone else.

For me, “works” means that a project is cost-effective at achieving worthwhile objectives. “Cost-effective” means that no other projects could accomplish the same objectives at a lower cost. “Worthwhile objectives” might include reducing traffic congestion, air pollution, or energy consumption. Though high-speed rail advocates are gleeful about the prospect, I don’t consider shutting down competing air service to be a worthwhile objective.

This series of posts on high-speed rail has revealed at least twelve important facts.

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High-Speed Rail Part 7: The Benefits of California HSR

The costs are exorbitant and rising. The risks are staggering. And the benefits? Even if you believe the Authority’s optimistic assumptions, you pretty much need a magnifying glass to see them.

What are the benefits claimed for the rail network? Less traffic congestion, less energy consumption, less air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions, economic development, and, of course, saving people’s time.

Congestion: With or without rail, the EIS predicts that highway congestion will be far worse in 2020 than it is today. With rail, highways parallel to the rail lines will have an average of 3.8 percent less traffic than if rail is not built (p. 3.1-12). Rail will do most on the L.A. to San Diego route (which will probably be one of the last segments to be built), taking 7.9 percent of cars off the road. It will remove 6.6 percent of cars on the Bay Area-to-Central Valley portion. Elsewhere the relief will be less than 3.5 percent.

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High-Speed Rail Part 6: The Risks of California HSR

Yesterday’s post on the costs of California high-speed rail discussed the likelihood that this megaproject will cost more than projected and the likelihood that taxpayers who pay for construction will have to pay again to rebuild the system every thirty or so years. Such costs are not so much a risk as a certainty. But there are many other risks involved with high-speed rail, some of which could unexpectedly drive up construction costs even more, and others affecting operations.

Some of these risks were identified in the senate oversight report on high-speed rail, including right-of-way, safety, and ridership risks. One important rish that was not brought out by the senate report is the risk that competing technologies will render high-speed rail obsolete.

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High-Speed Rail Part 5: The Cost of California HSR

The California High-Speed Rail Authority wants to build an 800-mile rail network between Sacramento, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Anaheim, and (via Riverside) San Diego. Electrically-powered trains would travel over this network at speeds up to 220 miles per hour, allowing people to get from downtown San Francisco to downtown L.A. in about 2-1/2 hours.

It isn’t clear to me why any self-respecting San Franciscan would want to get to downtown L.A. in 2-1/2 hours, though I can imagine why they would want to quickly return. I suppose the Northern-Southern California cultural divide works both ways. But the four big questions are: How much will it cost? What kind of risks are involved? What are the likely benefits? And what are the alternatives? Today’s post will focus on cost.

By any measure, California high-speed rail will be a megaproject, the most expensive public-works project ever planned by a single U.S. state. Exactly how much it will cost is still uncertain — estimates published in various places have varied over a wide range. Just as uncertain is who is going to pay that cost. What is certain is that the $9.95 billion in bonds (of which $9 billion is for high-speed rail and $0.95 billion is for connecting transit improvements) that California voters will decide upon this November will be little more than a down payment.

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High-Speed Rail Part 3: The Midwest Rail Initiative

In 1935, the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad — known as the Milwaukee Road for short — began operating steam-powered passenger trains at speeds up to 110 miles per hour between Chicago and Minneapolis. Passengers at that time had their choice of three railroads — the Milwaukee, the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy, and the Chicago & Northwestern — each of which had at least two trains a day that took 6-1/2 hours between Chicago and the Twin Cities.

The Hiawatha at 85 mph. Photo by Otto Perry, courtesy Denver Public Library.

Today’s Amtrak trains require eight hours for the same journey. The Midwest Regional Rail Initiative — a consortium of nine state departments of transportation — proposes to reduce this to 5-1/2 hours and to similarly speed service from Chicago to Detroit, Cleveland, Cincinnati, St. Louis, and other midwestern cities.

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Housing, Poverty, Crime, and Light Rail

A recent article in The Atlantic indirectly sheds some light on Portland’s light-rail crime wave. The article notes several research studies have shown that demolition of major housing projects, such as Chicago’s Cabrini Green, was soon followed by suburban crime waves. Residents of the housing projects used section 8 vouchers to move to lower-middle-class suburbs and, in some cases, brought the crime with them.

Moving poor people from public housing to private rental housing was supposed to help them get out of poverty, meaning children would be more likely to graduate from high school and adults more likely to get a job. But a reanalysis of the research on which this claim was based found that the sample size was small and that people who moved actually worked less in their new homes than when they lived in the projects.

Portland did not have high-rise public housing projects, but it did have a concentration of low-income people who were pushed out of their neighborhoods by urban-growth-boundary-induced gentrification. Portland planner John Fregonese puts a positive spin on this, saying that “segregation is breaking down in Portland.” While it is soothing to think that Portland is getting more integrated, it does not necessarily mean the lives of the people forced out by gentrification have improved.

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Rail Transit: Pay Now, Pay Later

Denver’s 119-mile FasTracks rail transit project, approved by voters in 2004, will cost at least $1.4 billion more than voters were told, according to the project’s 2007 annual report. Moreover, a revenue shortfall means that Denver’s Regional Transit District’s (RTD) ability to sell bonds to pay for construction will fall $400 million short of expectations.

Although RTD blames rising steel prices for the overrun, in fact a large share of the additional cost is due to RTD’s own inane decisions. The original plan called for running Diesel-powered trains from downtown to the airport, but RTD decided to spend another $400 million electrifying the route. RTD also changed routes on the North Metro line, adding at least $100 million to its costs.

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Is Dulles Rail Dead or Alive?

Dulles Rail All But Dead shrills the Washington Post. The idea of extending Washington’s MetroRail system 23 miles to (and slightly beyond) Dulles Airport has been around for years, but its huge expense — at least $5 billion or more than $200 million per mile — has been daunting.

To provide local matching funds, northern Virginia counties recently created a huge transportation authority that would tax home sales, hotel rooms, rental cars, and auto repairs to pay for local road and transit projects. It was generally understood that a large share of the authority’s money would go to Dulles rail, but local officials were counting on federal funding for at least half the cost of the project.

Only 12 percent of air travelers who fly out of National Airport use MetroRail to get to and from the airport. No other airport rail line in the country carries more than 8 percent of air travelers.
Flickr photo by sethladd.

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